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INTRODUCTION
At the end of the 2017 term, the Supreme Court decided not to
stop time. Nonpermanent residents who have been placed in
removal proceedings may apply for a discretionary form of relief
from the Attorney General known as “cancellation of removal.”1 To
be eligible, an applicant must show (in addition to meeting other
requirements) that she has been in the United States for at least ten
consecutive years.2 The period of continuous physical presence is
interrupted when the government serves the noncitizen with a
notice to appear at a removal hearing.3 However, in Pereira v.
Sessions, the Court held that if the notice does not list the time
and place of the hearing, which a separate provision—8 U.S.C.
§ 1229(a)—requires be included,4 the continuous presence clock
continues to run.5
While Pereira has generated immediate upheaval for cancellation
of removal eligibility,6 the case’s aftershocks are already proving to
be far greater. Since the decision was announced, there has been a
feverous debate about whether the case applies not just when
cancellation of removal is sought, but to all immigration removal
proceedings, since notices to appear are issued in every judicial
proceeding. It is a debate that reaches beyond immigration law
circles. Coverage in the popular press has been notable.7
1. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2012).
2. Id. § 1229b(b)(1)(A). Lawful permanent residents must have been in the country for
at least seven years continuously. Id. § 1229b(a)(2).
3. Id. § 1229b(d)(1).
4. Id. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i).
5. 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2110 (2018).
6. After Pereira, many courts reversed prior findings of ineligibility for cancellation of
removal based on the decision, including the Supreme Court itself. See, e.g., Saldana Castillo
v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2709, 2709 (2018) (granting certiorari petition, vacating judgment, and
remanding for further consideration in light of Pereira).
7. See Robin Abcarian, New Supreme Court Decision Could Upend Thousands of
Deportation Cases in Setback for Immigration Hard-Liners, L.A. TIMES (July 13, 2018, 3:00
AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/abcarian/la-me-abcarian-pereira-deportation-20180713-
story. html [https://perma.cc/96VU-Z253]; Joel Rose, Supreme Court Ruling Means Thousands
of Deportation Cases May Be Tossed Out, NPR (Sept. 17, 2018, 4:20 PM), https://www.npr.org/
2018/09/17/648832694/supreme-court-ruling-means-thousands-of-deportation-cases-may-be-
tossed-out [https://perma.cc/F3YC-LYSA]; Amy Taxin, Immigration Cases Tossed in Fallout
from Supreme Court Ruling, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Aug. 13, 2018, 4:27 PM), https://chicago.sun
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Less than a year later, hundreds of federal court opinions,
inclusive of both published and unpublished decisions, have
wrestled with Pereira’s application. Although it is harder to track
decisions by immigration judges,8 the number of rulings on Pereira
challenges brought by noncitizens is surely in the thousands.9
The volume of cases has not helped to settle the debate. To the
contrary, in Pereira’s aftermath the courts have taken wildly
divergent positions on the case’s meaning and are struggling to
understand the difficult issues raised by the decision.10 With Pereira
challenges being routinely raised by immigration lawyers across
the country,11 and the Supreme Court unlikely to weigh in again
anytime soon, the need for clarity is pressing and consequential.
The government maintains that Pereira bears no relevance
beyond the narrow context in which the case arose.12 By contrast,
immigration advocates insist not only that Pereira applies to all
adversarial removal proceedings but that the Court’s decision
necessarily means that immigration courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction in any case commenced with a notice to appear that did
not include the time and place of the proceedings.13 That argument
times.com/news/immigration-deportation-cases-tossed-supreme-court-ruling/ [https://perma.
cc/NP73-6KJ7].
8. Most decisions by immigration judges are not publicly available. Precedential
decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the highest administrative appeals court for
immigration cases, are available (as are some unpublished decisions, via subscription
services), but all actions and proceedings “relating to an order of removal, to relief from
removal, or to immigration benefits or detention” are not accessible through electronic
databases. FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(c).
9. See Reade Levinson & Kristina Cooke, U.S. Courts Abruptly Tossed 9,000 Deportation
Cases. Here’s Why, REUTERS (Oct. 17, 2018, 7:06 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
immigration-terminations/u-s-courts-abruptly-tossed-9000-deportation-cases-heres-why-idUS
KCN1MR1HK [https://perma.cc/8ZCU-AF2A]; see also Reade Levinson, Case Dismissals in
U.S. Immigration Court, REUTERS, http://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/editorcharts/USA-IM
MIGRATION-TERMINATIONS/0H0014BZ42J3/index.html [https://perma.cc/HF3Q-GEPN].
10. See infra text accompanying notes 85-92.
11. See DAN KESSELBRENNER ET AL., PRACTICE ADVISORY: CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF
NOTICES TO APPEAR LACKING TIME-AND-PLACE INFORMATION 3 (2018), https://www.immi
grantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/FINAL_Pereira_Advisory_updated_July_ 16th_
2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/HX3S-W5MW].
12. See infra text accompanying notes 131-34.
13. See Kit Johnson, Pereira v. Sessions: A Jurisdictional Surprise for Immigration
Courts, 3 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 2-3 (2018); Jeffrey S. Chase, The BIA vs. the
Supreme Court?, OPINIONS/ANALYSIS ON IMMIGR. L. (Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.jeffreyschase.
com/blog/2018/9/1/the-bia-vs-the-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/G9AU-FLAA]; Merle Kahn,
6 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:001
is hinged to this regulatory language that governs removal proceed-
ings: “Jurisdiction vests, and proceedings before an Immigration
Judge commence, when a charging document is filed with the
Immigration Court by the [Immigration and Naturalization]
Service.”14 Since 1996, the notice to appear has been the primary
charging document that the government serves on noncitizens who
face removal in adversarial proceedings.15
It follows, according to this view, that proceedings commenced
with a defective notice to appear—defective, that is, according to
Pereira, for not including the information required by § 1229(a)—
must be treated as void ab initio and retried because they were
commenced without subject matter jurisdiction.16 To put it mildly,
that interpretation of Pereira would implicate a whole lot of cases.
As of February 2019, there were more than 850,000 active proceed-
ings in the nation’s immigration courts.17 What is more, the govern-
ment admits that for at least the last three years, “almost 100
percent” of the notices to appear that it served did not include the
statutorily required time-and-place information.18 If the courts were
to reopen even finalized proceedings because they were tried
without subject matter jurisdiction, the number of cases affected
could be in the millions.
Beyond its impact on immigration law, what is also remarkable
about the debate over Pereira is that it more broadly invites us to
consider a number of difficult jurisprudential questions. For
starters, in deciding the threshold inquiry into whether Pereira
applies only to cancellation of removal cases, we confront a funda-
mental problem about judicial decision-making. How do lower courts
determine the controlling scope of precedent? More precisely, the
Top of the Ninth: Aug. 31, 2018 Part One, DANIEL SHANFIELD IMMIGR. DEF. (Aug. 31, 2018),
https://www.immigration-defense.com/our-blog/2018/august/top-of-the-ninth-Aug-31-2018-
part-one/ [https://perma.cc/7UW6-B49Y]; KESSELBRENNER ET AL., supra note 11, at 14-15.
14. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) (2018).
15. See id. § 1003.13 (defining the notice to appear as a charging document).
16. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 2-3.
17. Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRAC IMMIGR., https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immi
gration/court_backlog/ [https://perma.cc/BZF3-PLW8].
18. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2111 (2018). As we will see, the government’s
standard practice was to issue notices with a “TBA” placeholder; thereafter, it is up to the
clerk of the immigration court to send a notification telling the noncitizen when and where
to appear for the removal hearing. See infra text accompanying notes 34-36.
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debate over how broadly or narrowly to read Pereira helps shed light
on an important, but underexamined, aspect of the problem: what
is the proper treatment of limiting language in a judicial decision?
Appellate courts sometimes say that their judgments are “limited
by the facts” or should be “narrowly drawn.” In Pereira, Justice
Sotomayor twice repeated that the Court’s decision was “narrow.”19
What are lower courts to do with this kind of limiting language?
How do they figure out the precedential reach of a decision that a
higher court consciously drew narrowly?
Even if we conclude that Pereira applies to all notices to appear
at judicial removal proceedings (and I will show that the case must
be read to apply to all such notices), it is still necessary to consider
how this reading of the decision matters. That is, in what cases does
it matter, and under what circumstances? Unfortunately, the
predominant approach among courts and advocates has been to
examine Pereira challenges solely in jurisdictional terms. This is
unfortunate because courts have ended up conflating the conclusion
(a correct one, as I will explain) that a Pereira defect does not have
any jurisdictional significance with whether it has any consequences
at all.20 There may still be consequences if the government serves a
notice that is defective under Pereira, even if those consequences are
not jurisdictional. As I will show, whether a Pereira challenge can
be successfully made, and how, turns on three doctrinal consider-
ations that, to date, courts and advocates have largely ignored.
The first consideration is whether the Court’s decision in Pereira
applies retroactively and, if so, to what cases. When an appellate
court decides a civil case, the starting presumption is that the
decision applies to all pending cases; correspondingly, retroactivity
usually does not extend to fully resolved cases.21 Notwithstanding
these general presumptions, legislatures sometimes enact laws that
permit parties to seek relief far into the future. In immigration law
there are several statutes that permit noncitizens to ask a court to
reopen closed proceedings.22 Pereira provides us with a valuable
opportunity to consider how a broad statutory grant of authority to
19. Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2110, 2113.
20. See infra Part III.A.
21. See infra Part III.B.1.
22. See infra Part III.C.4.a.i. 
8 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:001
reopen a case after it has been decided can be reconciled with
presumptive retroactivity norms.
This initial inquiry into retroactivity links to a second question
that also must be confronted whenever a Pereira challenge is made.
Even when a decision is applied in a backward-looking way, what
if the legal issue was not previously raised in the prior cases?
Forfeiture rules normally require that parties make arguments to
preserve them,23 but should an argument be deemed forfeited if it
was not viable until after the law-changing decision was announced?
Finally, beyond these initial issues, there is a third doctrinal
problem—probably the most significant of the three—that a Pereira
challenge poses. Not every legal error is equally consequential. In
other contexts, the law excuses some errors as harmless.24 But how
do we distinguish between the kinds of errors that require correc-
tion and those that we acknowledge to be errors but, for prudential
reasons, allow to remain uncorrected?
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I frames the issues in
dispute, providing historical context leading up to the Court’s
decision in Pereira. Part II then considers Pereira’s reach and
meaning. I argue that the Court’s construction of § 1229(a) is neces-
sarily applicable to all notices to appear. Part III then considers the
consequences of service of a defective notice. Part III.A begins by
taking up the argument that a Pereira defect has jurisdictional
implications. After concluding that defective notice has no bearing
on an immigration court’s jurisdiction, Part III.B argues that
Pereira challenges should turn on the three factors, outlined above,
of retroactivity, forfeiture, and harmless error. Finally, in Part III.C,
I consider all of the different case types in which a Pereira challenge
might arise. I demonstrate that the three critical factors that control
whether a Pereira challenge can be made vary in each of these case
types.
23. See infra Part III.B.2.
24. See infra Part III.B.3.
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I. FRAMING THE ISSUES IN DISPUTE
A. Removal Proceedings
The current procedures for removing a noncitizen were adopted
in 1996 when Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) and merged what
had been two separate types of expulsion proceedings (then known
as “exclusion” and “deportation” proceedings) into a single type that
we now call “removal” proceedings.25 Under the pre-1996 practice,
the government initiated both deportation and exclusion proceed-
ings by an order to show cause.26 Under current law, when the
government seeks to begin removal proceedings, it must serve a
written notice, known as a “notice to appear,” on the noncitizen.27
The Attorney General has promulgated regulations governing
removal proceedings. Most relevant to our current inquiry, 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.14, provides that removal proceedings “commence” when the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) files a charging
document with the Immigration Court.28 According to § 1003.14(a):
“Jurisdiction vests, and proceedings before an Immigration Judge
commence, when a charging document is filed with the Immigration
25. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C.); Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257, 262 (2012) (noting that with IIRIRA’s passage
“Congress abolished the distinction between exclusion and deportation procedures and cre-
ated a uniform proceeding known as ‘removal’”). Before 1996, a noncitizen could obtain
“suspension” from deportation. See Arenas-Yepes v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir.
2005). IIRIRA eliminated that option to obtain relief from removal, though suspension is still
possible for certain types of cases. See id. at 115-16; Baltazar-Alcazar v. INS, 386 F.3d 940,
943 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004). Additionally, IIRIRA repealed section 106 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (previously codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a), which had allowed for judicial review
of deportation and exclusion orders. § 306(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-612. This part of the 1996 law
is regarded as a jurisdiction-stripping provision. Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 89
(2d Cir. 2001).
26. See Tablie v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 2006); Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d
1330, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001); see also 5 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 64.02 (rev. ed. 2019).
27. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (2012).
28. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) (2018).
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Court by [INS].”29 The regulations separately define a “Notice to
Appear” as a charging document.30
In § 1229(a), Congress set forth a list of requirements that a no-
tice to appear must include.31 Among the requirements, the one
centrally at issue in Pereira was the requirement to include the
“time and place at which the [removal] proceedings will be held.”32
However, for a number of years the government has ignored that
statutory directive. As it conceded in Pereira, since 2015 it has
almost never included the time and place for the removal proceed-
ings in the notices to appear it served.33
Beyond § 1003.14(a), a separate regulatory section contemplates
that the time and place of the hearing only need to be included in
the notice to appear “where practicable” and that “[i]f that informa-
tion is not contained in the Notice to Appear, the Immigration Court
shall be responsible for scheduling the initial removal hearing and
providing notice to the government and the alien of the time, place,
and date of hearing.”34 The government apparently never makes
individualized determinations of “practicality,” however.35 Instead,
the government’s regular practice pre-Pereira was to indicate in the
notice to appear that was served on the noncitizen that the actual
hearing date was “to be determined.”36 Thereafter, the immigration
court separately mailed to the nonresident another document,
known as the notice of hearing, which included the exact time and
place of the hearing.37 This two-step notice process remains the
current practice post-Pereira, with one notable, if stupefying,
exception that I discuss below involving the service of notices to
appear with “fake dates”—a superficial, if utterly indefensible and
29. Id.
30. Id. § 1003.13. For proceedings initiated after April 1, 1997, the only other documents
that the regulations recognize as a charging document are a “Notice of Referral to
Immigration Judge,” and a “Notice of Intention to Rescind and Request for Hearing by Alien.”
Id.
31. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1).
32. Id. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i).
33. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2111 (2018).
34. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(b).
35. See Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2111.
36. Id.; see also Haider v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 902, 903-04 (8th Cir. 2006) (discussing two-
step notice procedure).
37. See Haider, 438 F.3d at 904.
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inadequate, attempt by the government to comply with the Court’s
decision.38
Although there is no public data that comprehensively tracks how
long it usually takes the immigration court to send the notice of
hearing after service of the notice to appear, anecdotal evidence
suggests that, at least for the non-detained docket, there is usually
a significant delay. In Pereira, for instance, the Department of
Homeland Security initially served Pereira with the notice to appear
in May 2006. Fifteen months later, the immigration court clerk sent
a notice of hearing that included a specific hearing date—still
another three months later.39 Thus, the initial removal hearing in
Pereira was not scheduled until almost a year and a half after the
government first served Pereira with notice to appear at removal
proceedings.40
B. Facts and Legal Dispute in Pereira
Under § 1229b(b) of Title 8 of the United States Code, the
Attorney General has discretion to “cancel removal” and adjust the
status of a nonpermanent resident if, among other requirements,
the nonpermanent resident has been physically present in the
United States for at least ten years.41 (There is a comparable
provision governing lawful permanent residents, which requires
continuous physical presence for at least seven years.42) However,
according to § 1229b(d)(1), which is known as the “stop-time” rule,
the period of continuous physical presence that could make a
noncitizen eligible for cancellation of removal is interrupted when
the noncitizen is served with a notice to appear.43 More precisely,
the stop-time rule provides: “For purposes of this section, any period
of continuous residence or continuous physical presence in the
United States shall be deemed to end ... when the alien is served a
notice to appear under § 1229(a) of this title.”44 The recognized
38. See infra text accompanying notes 324-28.
39. Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2112.
40. Id.
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2012).
42. Id. § 1229b(a)(2).
43. Id. § 1229b(d)(1).
44. Id.
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reason for the stop-time rule is that Congress did not want to keep
the continuous clock running until the removal hearing because that
could incentivize the noncitizen to drag out the process to “buy time”
if they are just shy of the ten years when they receive the notice to
appear at the hearing.45
The precise legal question in Pereira was this: is the stop-time
rule triggered even if the notice to appear does not include the
removal proceeding’s time and place as § 1229(a) requires?46
C. Prior Judicial and Administrative Treatment of the Effect of a
Defective Notice to Appear
Before Pereira, a number of courts and the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) had considered the effect of a notice to appear that
lacked the time and place of the removal proceedings. One of the
first appellate courts to do so was the Ninth Circuit in Garcia-
Ramirez v. Gonzales.47 As it turns out, the issue in Garcia-Ramirez
did not centrally concern the notice to appear. Instead, the principal
question in Garcia-Ramirez was whether the noncitizen’s five-
month absence from the country interrupted her accrual of continu-
ous presence time in the United States.48 What makes Garcia-
Ramirez interesting, for present purposes, is that before addressing
the effect of her temporary absence from the country, the court first
concluded that the initial notice to appear did not interrupt the
continuous presence period.49 The court reasoned that the notice did
not trigger the stop-time rule because it failed to specify the date or
45. See Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2119 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 37-38, Pereira, 138 S. Ct.
2105 (2018) (No. 17-459)) (“Congress enacted the stop-time rule to prevent noncitizens from
exploiting administrative delays to ‘buy time’ during which they accumulate periods of
continuous presence.”).
46. See id. at 2110.
47. 423 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2005).
48. See id. The answer to that question, in turn, depended on the governing law. At the
time she was absent from the country, the relevant law did not treat a temporary departure
as a break in continuous presence. That law was later amended to treat even a temporary
absence as sufficient to interrupt continuous presence. If the later-enacted law was applied
retroactively, then the noncitizen’s period of continuous presence was interrupted and she
would have been ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court ultimately concluded that
the new law did apply retroactively, barring her from eligibility to apply for removal. See id.
at 938-41.
49. Id. at 937 n.3.
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location of the hearing, as § 1229(a) requires.50 Of equal note, even
the government agreed that only after service of a second notice to
appear that did include the time and place of the hearing—what the
court referred to as a “proper hearing notice”— was the noncitizen’s
accrual of physical presence finally interrupted.51
But Garcia-Ramirez’s view would not hold sway for very long.
Only a year later, without even discussing the Ninth Circuit’s
decision, the Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review to reopen
in absentia removal proceedings.52 In doing so, Haider v. Gonzales
rejected the noncitizen’s argument that the notice to appear did not
interrupt the period of continuous physical presence because it
failed to include the time and place of the removal hearing.53 The
court also rejected the noncitizen’s related argument that the
incomplete notice to appear was insufficient to vest jurisdiction
under § 1003.14.54
As to the stop-time rule, the court reasoned that the statute
“simply requires that an alien be provided written notice of his
hearing; it does not require that the [notice to appear] ... satisfy all
of § 1229(a)(1)’s notice requirements.”55 While the notice to appear
did not include time and place of the removal hearing, the subse-
quent notice of hearing mailed by the immigration court did.56 For
the Eighth Circuit, that was enough: “Our reading of the [Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act] and the regulations compels the conclusion
that the [notice to appear] and the [notice of hearing], which were
properly served on Haider, combined to provide the requisite
notice.”57 Because the notice was sufficient, the court also sum-
marily rejected, without elaboration, the noncitizen’s argument that
the notice to appear failed to vest jurisdiction with the immigration
court.58
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Haider v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 902, 903 (8th Cir. 2006).
53. See id. at 907-08.
54. Id. at 909-10.
55. Id. at 907.
56. Id. at 908.
57. Id. at 907.
58. Id. at 909-10.
14 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:001
Later that same year, a panel of the Seventh Circuit, following
Haider, similarly rejected a noncitizen’s identical arguments.59
Dababneh v. Gonzales followed the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in
Haider, rejecting both the argument that the notice to appear failed
to interrupt the period of continuous physical presence because it
lacked time and place information and that it deprived the immigra-
tion court of jurisdiction.60 As to the latter, the court noted, “The fact
that the government fulfilled its obligations under [§ 1229(a)] in two
documents—rather than one—did not deprive the [Immigration
Court] of jurisdiction to initiate removal proceedings.”61 Dababneh
also appeared to weigh as significant the government’s assertion
that circumstances often make it impracticable to provide the actual
hearing date and time in the notice to appear.62 In this same
connection, the court rejected the noncitizen’s argument that the
government was required to demonstrate under § 1003.18 why it
was impracticable to include the hearing time and place in the
notice to appear, reasoning that the noncitizen suffered no actual
prejudice.63
Thereafter, a number of other courts followed Haider and
Dababneh to hold that a notice to appear lacking the time and place
of the hearing is nevertheless valid.64 In one of them, Guamanrrigra
v. Holder, the Second Circuit quoted the stop-time rule (albeit only
in part), emphasizing that § 1229b(d)(1)(A) “specifies that the time
of accrual of physical presence ‘shall be deemed to end ... when the
alien is served with a notice to appear,’” omitting the last six words
of the subsection (“under section 1229(a) of this title”) that Pereira
would later find to be critical.65
Although Guamanrrigra did not mention it, in 2011 the BIA also
weighed in on the effect of a defective notice. In Camarillo, the BIA
59. Dababneh v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 806, 807 (7th Cir. 2006).
60. Id. at 808-10 (noting that the language of the stop-time rule “is clear: if an alien has
received a [notice to appear], the period of continuous presence is deemed to end”).
61. Id. at 809.
62. Id. (noting that the Department of Homeland Security “frequently serves [notices to
appear] where there is no immediate access to docketing information”).
63. Id. at 809-10.
64. See, e.g., Popa v. Holder, 571 F.3d 890, 895-96 (9th Cir. 2009); Gomez-Palacios v.
Holder, 560 F.3d 354, 359 (5th Cir. 2009).
65. 670 F.3d 404, 410 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) (2012)); see also
Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2110 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)).
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began by making the determination that the language of the stop-
time rule was ambiguous.66 It reasoned that the rule could be read
to require that the notice to appear include the time and place of the
hearing, but that it also could be read as “simply definitional.”67 By
this the BIA meant that the rule could be read only to “indicate[ ]
what the words ‘notice to appear’ refer to” and that, read this way,
the subsection “merely specifies the document the [Department of
Homeland Security] must serve on the alien to trigger the ‘stop-
time’ rule and does not impose substantive requirements for a notice
to appear to be effective in order for that trigger to occur.”68 The BIA
then stated that the key phrase in the statute was “served a notice
to appear” and so concluded that the better way to read the statute
was that Congress only included the words “under section [1229](a)
... to specify the document the [Department of Homeland Security]
must serve on the alien to trigger the ‘stop-time’ rule.”69
Camarillo also concluded that the statute’s legislative history
supported the court’s interpretation of the statutory text.70 The BIA
noted that Congress’s recognized intent in adopting the stop-time
rule was to prevent noncitizens who were close to accumulating ten
continuous years of physical presence from “buy[ing] time” by
delaying removal proceedings instituted just before they reached
the full ten years.71 The BIA reasoned that the stop-time rule was
meant to interrupt the period of continuous service as soon as the
government indicated its intent on having the noncitizen removed
from the country; therefore, “the inclusion of the date and time of
the hearing is not necessary for the Government’s intention in this
regard to be conveyed.”72
Most courts followed Camarillo. Indeed, with only one exception,
the courts before Pereira deferred to the BIA’s judgment that the
statutory language is ambiguous and that the better construction
does not require the time and place of the hearing to be included in
66. 25 I. & N. Dec. 644, 647 (B.I.A. 2011).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 649-50.
71. Id. at 649; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
72. Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 650.
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the notice to appear to trigger the stop-time rule.73 Each of these
courts concluded that Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. requires deference to the BIA’s interpretation
of the statute, reasoning that its interpretation of the statutory text
was reasonable.74 The only exception is Orozco-Velasquez v. Attorney
General U.S., in which the Third Circuit held that Camarillo’s
construction of the statutory text was not entitled to deference
under Chevron because it conflicted with § 1229(a)’s plain text.75
Disagreeing with all of the prior decisions, Orozco-Velasquez
concluded that § 1229(a) unmistakably requires that the notice to
appear includes time and place information and, therefore, only a
notice to appear that satisfies § 1229(a)’s requirements can effec-
tively stop time under § 1229b(d)(1).76
D. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Pereira and Its Aftermath
This, then, was the state of the law when the Court granted
certiorari in Pereira. All circuits but one had held, or deferred to the
BIA’s judgment, that the better reading of § 1229(a) was that it does
not require the time and place of the hearing to be included in the
notice to appear—either to vest jurisdiction with the immigration
court or to trigger the stop-time rule. Nevertheless, in an 8-1
decision, Pereira rejected this prior statutory construction.77 The
Court held that a notice to appear that does not include the time
and place of the removal proceedings is not a valid notice for
purposes of the stop-time rule.78
73. See Pereira v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 2017); Moscoso-Castellanos v. Lynch,
803 F.3d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir. 2015); O’Garro v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 14-13080, 2015 WL
2436963, at *3-4 (11th Cir. May 22, 2015) (per curiam); Guaman-Yuqui v. Lynch, 786 F.3d
235, 240 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Gonzalez-Garcia v. Holder, 770 F.3d 431, 434-35 (6th Cir.
2014); Yi Di Wang v. Holder, 759 F.3d 670, 674-75 (7th Cir. 2014); Urbina v. Holder, 745 F.3d
736, 740 (4th Cir. 2014).
74. See 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
75. 817 F.3d 78, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2016).
76. Id.
77. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2109-10 (2018).
78. Id. at 2113-14 (“A putative notice to appear that fails to designate the specific time or
place of the noncitizen’s removal proceedings is not a ‘notice to appear under section 1229(a),’
and so does not trigger the stop-time rule.”).
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In Part II, below, I walk through the Court’s reasoning in detail.
For now, two brief points about the Court’s decision are worth
making. First, it bears noting that the noncitizen in Pereira did not
argue that a defective notice is insufficient to vest the court with
jurisdiction under § 1003.14 and the Court never addressed this
jurisdictional issue. More on this in a moment.79 Second, it is also
important to say—because this too will become relevant later80—
that the noncitizen in Pereira did not seek to dismiss or terminate
the removal proceedings. His only application to the court was for
cancellation of removal on the basis that the stop-time rule was not
triggered by the initial notice to appear. As we will see, both of these
points about the limits of the argument that Pereira made have
figured prominently in the subsequent debate over how broadly the
Court’s decision reaches.
As impactful as Pereira has been for cancellation of removal
eligibility, the case’s aftershocks are already proving to be even
more significant.81 Even in cases not involving applications for
cancellation of removal, immigration advocates across the country
have been routinely raising Pereira challenges to the sufficiency of
the notices to appear that the government served on their clients.82
79. See infra Part II.C.3.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 148-65.
81. Pereira may also herald further upheaval, especially with regard to the long-honored
deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes owed under Chevron. Chevron v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). A concurrence by Justice Kennedy in Pereira
(one of his very last published opinions before he retired) provocatively suggested that it may
be time to revisit Chevron deference. Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2121 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(noting that “it seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider, in an appropriate case, the
premises that underlie Chevron and how courts have implemented that decision”). For more
on Kennedy’s concurrence, see Geoffrey A. Hoffman, Why Pereira v. Sessions Bodes Well for
Overturning Matter of A-B-, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (July 2, 2018), https://lawprofessors.
typepad.com/immigration/2018/07/why-pereira-v-sessions-bodes-well-for-overturning-matter-
of-a-b-by-geoffrey-a-hoffman.html [https://perma.cc/6TGY-CQE7] (discussing Chevron and
Kennedy’s concurrence), and Ian Millhiser, Justice Kennedy Just Gave Steve Bannon a Big
Reason to Smile, THINKPROGRESS (June 21, 2018), https://thinkprogress.org/supreme-court-
pereira-sessions-chevron-45c22b26631f/ [https://perma.cc/37XA-53EA] (noting that “Pereira
v. Sessions is, at least on the surface, a minor case” but that Justice Kennedy “wrote a brief
concurring opinion suggesting that the Court should upend the balance of power between
elected presidents and unelected judges that has existed since the Supreme Court’s [Chevron]
decision”).
82. See, e.g., KESSELBRENNER ET AL., supra note 11, at 9-17.
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The government’s position is that Pereira applies only to the
narrow context in which the case arose. Adopting the government’s
view, a number of immigration judges initially held that Pereira
only decided when a notice to appear is sufficient to stop the con-
tinuous presence clock for purposes of cancellation of removal
eligibility.83 On this view, the Court’s decision should not be read to
require that all notices to appear include the time-and-place
information required by § 1229(a).84 Many other immigration judges,
though, have applied Pereira expansively to find that dismissal is
warranted whenever the government serves a notice to appear that
lacks the time and place of the proceedings.85 Indeed, in the first
couple of months after the decision was announced, immigration
judges terminated a record 9000 removal proceedings.86 By com-
parison, less than half as many were terminated during this same
period the year before, strongly suggesting that Pereira challenges
were at least originally successful in many of these cases.87
Among federal courts, Pereira has also had a mixed reception.
Some federal district judges have thrown out criminal indictments
for illegal reentry based on a Pereira challenge to the underlying
final order of removal;88 others have refused to apply Pereira as
broadly.89 The federal appellate courts have only just begun to weigh
in on the merits, but there are already signs of a developing circuit
83. See, e.g., [Redacted], (Miami Immigration Ct. July 23, 2018) (on file with author).
84. See id.
85. See, e.g., Motion to Dismiss at 9, Ex. C, United States v. Virgen-Ponce, 320 F. Supp.
3d 1164 (E.D. Wash. 2018) (No. 2:10-CR-00092) (citing two decisions from immigration judges
in Seattle and Phoenix).
86. See Levinson & Cooke, supra note 9.
87. See Levinson, supra note 9.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Zapata-Cortinas, No. SA-18-CR-00343-OLG, 2018 WL
4770868, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2018) (granting detained alien’s motion to dismiss
indictment on basis that, under Pereira, the immigration court lacked jurisdiction over
removal proceedings initiated by a notice to appear that did not include the date and time of
the removal proceedings); Virgen-Ponce, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 1165-66 (decided on the same
grounds).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Ibarra-Rodriguez, No. CR-18-190-M, 2018 WL 4608503, at
*2-3 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 25, 2018) (agreeing that notice to appear was defective under Pereira,
but concluding that “such statutory defect does not automatically make the removal order
fundamentally unfair”); United States v. Morales-Hernandez, No. CR-18-00365-TUC-RCC,
2018 WL 4492377, at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 18, 2018) (distinguishing Pereira because defendant
“was present and participated in the proceedings resulting in his removal”).
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split.90 As of this writing, the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits have reached the most definitive conclusion, squarely
rejecting the noncitizen’s argument that a notice lacking the time
and place of the proceedings is insufficient to vest the immigration
court with jurisdiction.91 Complicating the picture, in September
2018 the BIA, in an important precedential decision, read Pereira as
applicable only to cancellation of removal cases.92 Given the divi-
sions among the lower courts that emerged before the BIA decision,
it is no surprise that the courts are also divided over whether its
decision in Bermudez-Cota should be followed.93 And in a subse-
quent precedential decision, the BIA—over a strenuous dissent—
ruled that a notice of hearing that contains time-and-place infor-
mation perfects a deficient notice to appear and triggers the stop-
time rule.94 The BIA’s second decision concerning Pereira similarly
has not been followed by several federal courts.95 In short, the courts
have been all over the map about what Pereira means.
90. Compare, e.g., Hernandez-Perez v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 305, 314 (6th Cir. 2018)
(reading Pereira narrowly), with Duran-Ortega v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 18-14563-D, 2018 U.S.
App. LEXIS 33531, at *5-7 (11th Cir. Nov. 29, 2018) (Martin, J., concurring) (signaling
willingness to read Pereira broadly).
91. See Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1160 (9th Cir. 2019) (“The regulatory
definition, not the one set forth in § 1229(a), governs the Immigration Court’s jurisdiction. A
notice to appear need not include time and date information to satisfy this standard. [The
petitioner’s] notice to appear met the regulatory requirements and therefore vested
jurisdiction in the IJ.”); Santos-Santos v. Barr, 917 F.3d 486, 490 (6th Cir. 2019); Banegas
Gomez v. Barr, 922 F.3d 101, (2d Cir. 2019) (following Karingithi and Hernandez-Perez);
Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956, 963 (7th Cir. 2019) (partially refusing to follow
reasoning in Karingithi and Hernandez-Perez but concluding that “failure to comply with the
statute dictating the content of a Notice to Appear is not one of those fundamental flaws that
divests a tribunal of adjudicatory authority. Instead, just as with every other claim-processing
rule, failure to comply with that rule may be grounds for dismissal of the case”); Hernandez-
Perez, 911 F.3d at 314-15 (holding that “jurisdiction vests with the immigration court where
... the mandatory information about the time of the hearing is provided in a Notice of Hearing
issued after the NTA”) (internal citation omitted).
92. See Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. 441, 447 (B.I.A. 2018).
93. Compare, e.g., Karingithi, 913 F.3d at 1159 (following Bermudez-Cota), and
Hernandez-Perez, 911 F.3d at 314 (same), with Zapata-Cortinas, 2018 WL 4770868 at *2, *5
n.6 (holding that a “plain reading” of § 1229(a) demonstrates that a notice to appear that fails
to include the time and date of the hearing “fails to vest jurisdiction for a removal proceeding
in an immigration court”).
94. Mendoza-Hernandez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 520, 529 (B.I.A. 2019) (en banc).
95. See, e.g., Lopez v. Barr, 925 F.3d 396, 402 (9th Cir. 2019) (rejecting Mendoza-
Hernandez’s construction of § 1229(a)). 
20 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:001
II. READING PEREIRA CORRECTLY
Post-Pereira, the initial pressing question should be whether the
Court’s decision is limited only to cancellation of removal cases.
Unfortunately, as we will see, some courts have conflated this initial
inquiry with whether Pereira has jurisdictional implications. But
the question of how broadly the case applies logically has to come
first—if Pereira only applies to cancellation of removal cases, then
the case’s jurisdictional implications, if any, will be similarly limited
only to cancellation of removal proceedings.
In this Part, I consider the arguments that have been advanced
for reading Pereira as controlling only for cancellation of removal
cases. But before I get to those arguments, it is necessary to place
the more specific question of Pereira’s reach into a larger jurispru-
dential framework.
A. Precedent and the Use of Limiting Language
The threshold question that must be considered in grappling with
Pereira’s reach can be situated within the broader theoretical
inquiry into how lower courts determine the controlling scope of
precedent. What it means to say that a precedent is controlling is
the subject of a rich academic literature, reflecting the difficulties
of determining the extent to which a higher court’s judgment is
binding.96
96. See Ruggero J. Aldisert, Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn’t; When Do We Kiss It
and When Do We Kill It?, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 605, 606-07 (1990); Larry Alexander, Constrained
by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1989); Shawn J. Bayern, Case Interpretation, 36 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 125, 127-28 (2009); Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
1997, 1998-99 (1994); Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE
L.J. 161, 165 (1930); Randy J. Kozel, The Scope of Precedent, 113 MICH. L. REV. 179, 181-83
(2014); Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1249, 1257-59 (2006); Andrew C. Michaels, The Holding-Dictum Spectrum, 70 ARK. L. REV.
661, 662, 664-65, 667 (2017); Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 634-
35, 641-42 (1995) [hereinafter Schauer, Giving Reasons]; Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39
STAN. L. REV. 571, 572-73 (1987) [hereinafter Schauer, Precedent]; Patricia M. Wald, The
Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371,
1372, 1394-95 (1995).
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An important, but underexamined, aspect of the problem of ascer-
taining precedential reach is how lower courts should take account
of limiting language in a judicial decision. It is an important issue
because appellate courts often use restrictive language in describing
their decisions. Courts say things such as our opinion “is limited
by the particular facts before us”97 or the judgment in this case is
meant to be “narrowly construed.”98 In Pereira, Justice Sotomayor
twice repeated that the Court’s decision was “narrow.”99 What are
lower courts to do with this kind of limiting language? How do they
figure out the precedential reach of a decision cast as “limited” or
“narrow” by a higher court?
1. Precedent Is Not Supposed to Be Confined to Complete
Factual Identity
To try to gain a more coherent understanding of what meaning we
are to ascribe to limiting words, it is helpful to begin by describing
what they are not supposed to mean. Although legal decisions nec-
essarily must be made in relation to the facts in a case,100 few would
subscribe to the view that a case is binding on a lower court only
when an identical set of facts are presented in a future case. There
will almost always be some variance in the facts of different cases.101
97. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 893 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in judgment) (“I would adhere strictly to our precedents and the limited facts found
by the New Jersey Supreme Court.”); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460 (2011) (noting that
“the reach of our opinion here is limited by the particular facts before us”); United Pub.
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 92 (1947) (“We proceed to consider the controversy over
constitutional power at issue ... as defined by the charge and preliminary [evidence].... Our
determination is limited to those facts.”).
98. See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1379
(2018) (“We emphasize the narrowness of our holding.”); City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S.
Ct. 2443, 2454 (2015) (“Finally, we underscore the narrow nature of our holding.”); Snyder,
562 U.S. at 460 (“Our holding today is narrow.”).
99. See Pereira v. Sessions, 138 St. Ct. 2105, 2113 (2018).
100. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821) (“It is a maxim not to be
disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the
case in which those expressions are used.”).
101. See Schauer, Precedent, supra note 96, at 577 (“No two events are exactly alike. For
a decision to be a precedent for another decision does not require that the facts of the earlier
and the later cases be absolutely identical. Were that required, nothing would be a precedent
for anything else.”).
22 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:001
Complete identity of fact has never been regarded as a requirement
of precedent.102
Moreover, in our common law system, it is conceptually inaccu-
rate to treat a judicial decision as strictly confined to its facts. Every
legal rule that comes out of a judicial decision, as Larry Alexander
has noted, “by virtue of being a rule, decides issues that are broader
than the particular facts of the cases in which they are announc-
ed.”103 And to insist on complete identity of fact could be destabiliz-
ing to the hierarchical structure of our system by making it far too
easy for a subordinate court to ignore a higher court’s judgments.104
2. The Exceptional Case of Limiting Language as a 
Nullification Effort
But if a self-described “narrow” or “limited” opinion should not be
read only to control in cases of complete factual identity, we
nevertheless expect lower courts to pay close attention to and
carefully parse the words that appellate judges use. Among other
considerations, the language used by the author of an opinion may
reflect necessary compromises to gain the support of other judges.
Thus, in Pereira, the linguistic choice to call its decision “narrow”
may have been necessary to secure an eight-person majority.105 But,
even if it was, a narrow holding still has some precedential force,
does it not? What are lower courts to do, then, with such limiting
language?
102. See Aldisert, supra note 96, at 621 (“In examining the cases, as a scientist in a
laboratory, the judge should not look for the rigid fixity of facts. Seldom are there perfectly
identical experiences in human affairs.”).
103. Alexander, supra note 96, at 25 (emphasis omitted).
104. See id. at 20 (“[I]f a constrained court could escape the constraint of a precedent rule
by citing any factual distinctions between the precedent case and the constrained case—
whether or not those factual distinctions are relevant under the rule announced in the pre-
cedent case or are relevant under any plausible moral principle—a precedent case and its rule
could never constrain, and the distinction between distinguishing a case and overruling it
would collapse.”).
105. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 St. Ct. 2105, 2110 (2018); see Wald, supra note 96, at 1377-78
(“Opinion writing among judges of widely disparate views and temperaments is, like
governing, the art of the possible.... If alternative rationales are available to support a result,
the one that can garner a majority of judges will be chosen, even if it is not the writer’s
preferred one.”).
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A helpful starting place is to recognize that not all uses of limiting
language are equivalent. In one of the few pieces that carefully
considers judicial use of limiting language, the author of a thought-
ful, if brief, student comment points out that one extreme use of
limiting language can be for the purpose of marginalizing—“nullify-
ing”— the decision it just enacted.106 This obviously does not happen
often, since courts usually are not in the business of disavowing the
precedential effect of their own decisions.107
There is, however, an infamous example in which the Supreme
Court tried to do just that. In Bush v. Gore, having waded into the
middle of a closely contested presidential election to announce a
new rule of equal protection, the per curiam opinion for the major-
ity insisted that its decision would have no precedential effect in
future cases: “Our consideration is limited to the present circum-
stances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes
generally presents many complexities.”108
Among academic commentators, a widely held critique of the
Bush v. Gore opinion centrally emphasized the Court’s attempt to
annul any precedential effect of its decision. Pamela Karlan, for
instance, offered this trenchant criticism:
[P]recisely to the extent that the Supreme Court announces that
it, and the lower courts, should feel free to decide future equal
protection challenges without considering Bush v. Gore, it
creates suspicion that its decision was result-oriented. That the
Court felt free to announce this entirely new rule in a case with
such tremendous stakes, and then immediately to repudiate the
precedential value of its decision, marks a staggering rejection
of precedent’s constraining force.109
106. Chad Flanders, Comment, Bush v. Gore and the Uses of “Limiting,” 116 YALE L.J.
1159, 1161 (2007).
107. Id. (“When the Court decides a case and offers reasons for its decisions, the very act
of giving reasons will suggest that the same reasons could be applied to similar
circumstances.”).
108. 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam).
109. Pamela S. Karlan, When Freedom Isn’t Free: The Costs of Judicial Independence in
Bush v. Gore, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 265, 281-82 (2003) (footnote omitted); see also Samuel
Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 637, 650 (2001) (decrying the majority’s
attempt to limit the binding effect of its decision as a “disingenuous limiting instruction”).
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This critique underscores a key point: In our hierarchical common
law system, courts do not get to limit the precedential reach of their
decisions. By their very nature, the decisions of higher courts are
supposed to bind lower courts to the extent that the precedent case
and the subsequent case are materially similar.110 This is a matter
of basic fairness—like cases should be treated the same. Moreover,
the expectation that all cases have some precedential value also
effectively forces higher courts to think more carefully about their
decisions. Frederick Schauer has pointed out that
the conscientious decisionmaker must recognize that future
conscientious decisionmakers will treat her decision as prece-
dent, a realization that will constrain the range of possible
decisions about the case at hand. If the future must treat what
we do now as presumptively binding, then our current decision
must judge not only what is best for now, but also how the
current decision will affect the decision of other and future
assimilable cases.111
Given that Bush v. Gore is antithetical to our common law
tradition insofar as it purports to limit its own precedential effect,
it offers an important insight for understanding the far more com-
mon use of limiting language in a judicial decision. There is a
critical difference between a court purporting to negate any future
effect of its own decision and other uses of limiting language. That
is, outside of this exceptional circumstance, even a decision that is
characterized as narrow or limited is still meant to have some
precedential force.112
Once we recognize Bush v. Gore’s use of limiting language to be
anomalous, it becomes clear that for all other cases the question is
not whether an opinion that uses limiting language has any prece-
dential effect. Instead, the relevant inquiry is to ask how far a
court’s self-described “narrow” decision reaches. Framed in this way,
determining what meaning to ascribe to limiting language in a
judicial decision is ultimately no different than the basic task that
110. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 112-17
(1991) (arguing that a precedent court is not able to preordain its precedential reach); cf.
Schauer, Precedent, supra note 96, at 589.
111. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 96, at 589.
112. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
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lower courts routinely perform in determining precedential reach.
The question is whether some later set of facts and circumstances
are similar enough to come within the parameters, however broadly
or narrowly defined, of the precedent decision.113
3. Ascertaining Precedential Reach
One approach that lower courts take in evaluating the degree of
similarity across cases is to consider the words used in the prece-
dent decision.114 Sometimes, explicit language makes it easy to see
the limits of precedent’s reach—and that is especially true when it
comes to the limiting language in a decision. For instance, the court
in the precedent case might say, “We do not reach Issue X and ex-
press no opinion about it because the record has not been ade-
quately developed to address it on direct appeal.”115 These express
words of limitation reflect that the court did not intend to announce
any rule that would bind a future court as to that specific issue.
Even with words of express limitation, however, lower courts will
still feel compelled to fully parse the language in a higher court’s
decision to ascertain whether any parts of the court’s reasoning on
issues that it did resolve bear relevance to the new facts and issues
to be considered.116 And the predominant approach among lower
courts is to read appellate decisions—and decisions by the Supreme
Court, in particular—in a “broadly inclusive” manner, as Randy
Kozel has noted.117 This explains, in good measure, why the
113. See Schauer, Precedent, supra note 96, at 577, 579 (“In order to assess what is a
precedent for what, we must engage in some determination of the relevant similarities
between the two events.... The task of a theory of precedent is to explain, in a world in which
a single event may fit into many different categories, how and why some assimilations are
plausible and others are not.”).
114. See Bayern, supra note 96, at 137 (noting that in determining precedent, the lower
court must consider, inter alia, “what the court said” and “the context in which the court said
it”); Schauer, Precedent, supra note 96, at 573 (“Dealing with the use of past precedents thus
requires dealing with the presence of the previous decisionmaker’s words.”).
115. See, e.g., United States v. Beauchamp, No. 06-30119, 2006 WL 2854456, at *1 (5th Cir.
Oct. 5, 2006) (per curiam) (“We do not reach that claim ... because the record has not been
adequately developed to address it.”).
116. Kozel, supra note 96, at 203 (“The principles that define a precedent’s scope of
applicability will determine its vertical, or hierarchical, power to constrain inferior courts. The
effect is especially pronounced in legal systems, such as the American federal system, that
treat vertical precedent as absolutely binding.” (footnote omitted)).
117. Id. at 199.
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distinction between holdings and dictum has been shown to be far
less significant for Supreme Court decisions.118
At the same time, while linguistic choices matter, it is also neces-
sary for lower courts to keep in mind that a precedent court’s word
choice may not be dispositive.119 Something does not become a hold-
ing merely because the court labels it that way.120 Similarly,
precedential scope cannot turn on a mechanical distinction between
holding and dictum any more than it does on the labeling of an
opinion as broad or narrow. A decision self-described as “broad” is
necessarily limited by the same constraints that apply to all judi-
cial decisions, just as a decision characterized as “narrow” still has
some precedential force.121
What matters far more than labels is taking account of the ratio-
nales that the precedent court articulated to reach its conclusions.122
As Frederick Schauer put it, the reasoning (or ratio decidendi) of a
decision will go beyond the case because “to provide a reason for a
decision is to include that decision within a principle of greater
generality than the decision itself.... transcend[ing] the very partic-
ularity of the case.”123
The Supreme Court itself has made clear that subsequent courts
must consider both the outcome of a higher court’s decision and the
118. See David Klein & Neal Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: Theory Versus Practice in Lower
Court Decision Making, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2021, 2026 (2013) (“Lower courts often
mention the distinction between holding and dictum but hardly ever invoke it in
consequential ways.”); Kozel, supra note 96, at 198-99.
119. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 123 (1961) (“In all fields of experience, not only
that of rules, there is a limit, inherent in the nature of language, to the guidance which
general language can provide.”).
120. See Dorf, supra note 96, at 2059 (“The precedential force of an earlier case ultimately
rests upon the reasons underlying the court’s decision. This is true both because absent a
consideration of reasons, namely, abstract principles, there is no such thing as precedent, and
because precedents derive their legitimacy from their reasoning.”); Leval, supra note 96, at
1257 (“A dictum is not converted into holding by ... preceding it with the words ‘We hold
that.’”).
121. Cf. Dorf, supra note 96, at 2060 (suggesting that stare decisis “limit[s] the freedom of
modern courts to reconfigure past decisions”).
122. See id. at 2059; Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741,
746-47 (1993) (“We cannot fully describe the outcome in case X if we do not know something
about the reasons that count in its favor. We cannot say whether decided case X has anything
to do with undecided case Y unless we are able to abstract, a bit, from the facts and holding
of case X. The key point is that analogical reasoning involves a process in which principles are
developed with constant reference to particular cases.”).
123. Schauer, Giving Reasons, supra note 96, at 641 (emphasis omitted).
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rationale for that outcome. In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that the Court adheres to the
“well-established rationale” upon which prior decisions were based
and that “it is not only the result but also those portions of the
opinion necessary to that result by which [the Court is] bound.”124
Justice Kennedy made the same point in his separate opinion in
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union: “As a general
rule, the principle of stare decisis directs us to adhere not only to
the holdings of our prior cases, but also to their explications of the
governing rules of law.”125
It follows from these general approaches to ascertaining prece-
dential reach that a self-described “narrow” or “limited” opinion
should not be read to control only in cases of complete factual iden-
tity. With the exception of nullifying decisions such as Bush v. Gore
that are, by their nature, out of place in our common law tradi-
tion,126 we ascertain the precedential reach of a judicial decision that
uses limiting language in the same way that we determine the
binding effect of any decision.127 However broadly or narrowly a
decision is characterized, the relevant inquiry is whether some later
set of facts and circumstances are similar enough to justify following
the precedent decision.128 That inquiry requires consideration of the
decision’s text and the context in which the case arose, along with
the reasoning that the higher court employed to reach its conclu-
sions.129 As we have seen, these are the same considerations that
lower courts must always take into account when ascertaining
precedent’s reach.130 We can now apply these broader insights into
precedent to Pereira.
B. The Arguments for Reading Pereira Narrowly
Those who maintain that the Court’s decision has no precedential
application beyond cancellation of removal cases advance two main
124. 517 U.S. 44, 66-67 (1996).
125. 492 U.S. 573, 668 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
126. See Flanders, supra note 106, at 1161.
127. See supra Parts II.A.1-2.
128. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
129. See supra Part II.A.2.
130. See supra Part II.A.2.
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arguments. The first argument is what we might call the dog that
did not bark argument. This argument finds great meaning in what
Pereira did not say—likening the importance of the Court’s silence
to the crime-revealing significance in the dog’s failure to bark the
night the racehorse was stolen in Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s story.131
Proponents of this view insist that it is significant that the Court
said nothing about the effect of its decision beyond cancellation of
removal cases. Because the Court did not hold that all proceedings
involving notices to appear should be invalidated or terminated if
they lack the necessary time and place information, proponents of
this view say the case cannot be read so broadly.132 In this same
connection, the government, as well as some courts, have been quick
to point out that the Court in Pereira seemed to go out of its way to
characterize the decision as reaching only a “narrow” question.133
Relatedly, both the government and some lower courts have em-
phasized that the Court did not invalidate the underlying removal
order in Pereira for lack of jurisdiction.134 On this view, because the
Pereira case itself was remanded for further proceedings,135 the
Court must not have thought that there was any underlying
jurisdictional defect in the case to warrant its outright dismissal.136
Pereira, it is said, answered one question and one question only: it
told us only that a notice to appear that does not include the time
and place of the proceeding is ineffective to stop the continuous
131. See SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 400 (1953).
132. See Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. 441, 444 (B.I.A. 2018) (“While the Court held that
such a notice to appear is insufficient to trigger the ‘stop-time’ rule, it did not indicate that
proceedings involving similar notices to appear ... should be invalidated or that the
proceedings should be terminated.”).
133. See Hernandez-Perez v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 305, 314 (6th Cir. 2018) (following
Bermudez-Cota in noting that “Pereira’s emphatically ‘narrow’ framing ... counsels in favor
of distinguishing” cancellation of removal cases from all other contexts); Bermudez-Cota, 27
I. & N. Dec. at 443 (“Had the Court intended to issue a holding as expansive as the one
advanced ... presumably it would not have specifically referred to the question before it as
being ‘narrow.’”).
134. See Hernandez-Perez, 911 F.3d at 314; Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 443
(“Significantly, the Court did not purport to invalidate the alien’s underlying removal
proceedings or suggest that proceedings should be terminated. In fact, the Court remanded
the matter for ‘further proceedings.’”).
135. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018).
136. See Hernandez-Perez, 911 F.3d at 314.
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physical presence clock.137 As Edgar Allen Poe would say, “Only this
and nothing more.”138
The other primary argument that some have advanced for limit-
ing the Court’s decision is what we can call the actual notice
objection. This argument posits that Pereira has no application
where the noncitizen receives actual notice of when and where the
hearing will be held.139 Proponents of this view point out that the
noncitizen in Pereira did not receive notice of the time and place of
the hearing.140 The notice to appear that was served on him lacked
that information—and he never received the notice of hearing that
was subsequently sent because the immigration court mailed it to
an old address.141 (Pereira had provided a more current address to
the government, but the immigration court failed to send it there.142)
Those who support a narrow reading of Pereira argue that if a
noncitizen receives actual notice of the hearing, then the concerns
that the Court expressed about improper notice are inapplicable.143
In essence, this reading of Pereira concludes that what the Court
really cared about was not strict compliance with § 1229(a) but
whether the noncitizen was actually apprised of when the hearing
would be. In support of this actual notice argument, proponents cite
to all of the pre-Pereira cases that upheld the two-step notice
process the government has been using—that is, service of the
initial notice to appear, followed by mailing of the notice of hearing
that includes the specific time and place of the removal proceed-
ings.144 Implicit in this argument is the assumption that, with the
sole exception of the stop-time rule, Pereira does not disapprove of
using this two-step notification procedure, a procedure that almost
all pre-Pereira courts upheld. In effect, these courts are saying that
137. See id.
138. EDGAR ALLEN POE, The Raven, in COMPLETE POEMS AND SELECTED ESSAYS 71 (Richard
Gray ed., 1993).
139. See Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 447 (“Because the respondent received proper
notice of the time and place of his proceeding when he received the notice of hearing, his
notice to appear was not defective.”).
140. See id. at 443 (“Pereira involved a distinct set of facts. Unlike the alien in that case,
the respondent here was properly served with both a notice to appear and a subsequent notice
of hearing.”).
141. See Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2112 (2018).
142. See id.
143. See Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 447.
144. See id. at 445-47 (citing cases).
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what matters is function, not form. As long as the noncitizen
receives some kind of actual notice, there is nothing to complain
about.145
C. Responding to the Arguments for Restricting Pereira’s 
Precedential Reach
Unquestionably, Justice Sotomayor’s opinion emphasized the
textual interplay between the stop-time rule and § 1229(a). Focus-
ing on the cross-reference in § 1229b(d)(1) to a notice served “under
section 1229(a) of this title,” the Court concluded that only a notice
served in compliance with § 1229(a)—i.e., one that specifies the time
and place of the removal proceedings—is sufficient to stop the
continuous presence clock.146 But it does not follow that Pereira has
nothing to teach us about the sufficiency of notices in other contexts.
1. Pereira Construed § 1229(a) Independent of the 
Stop-Time Rule
By trying to find meaning in what the Court did not say, propo-
nents of the dog that did not bark argument baldly ignore what it
did say. A close read of the decision shows that Pereira necessarily
construed § 1229(a) independently of its construction of the stop-
time rule.147 Consider this critical passage in which the Court spoke
directly about § 1229(a)’s requirements. Rejecting the view ad-
vanced by the government and the dissent that the statute is not
worded in the form of a definition, the Court observed:
Section 1229(a), however, does speak in definitional terms, at
least with respect to the “time and place at which the proceed-
ings will be held”: It specifically provides that the notice
described under paragraph (1) is “referred to as a ‘notice to
appear,’” which in context is quintessential definitional lan-
guage. It then defines that term as a “written notice” that, as
relevant here, “specif[ies] ... [t]he time and place at which the
[removal] proceedings will be held.” Thus, when the term “notice
145. Cf. id. at 447 (holding that actual notice is sufficient).
146. See Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2110, 2118.
147. See id. at 2116.
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to appear” is used elsewhere in the statutory section, including
as the trigger for the stop-time rule, it carries with it the
substantive time-and-place criteria required by § 1229(a).148
The entirety of the excerpted passage, and perhaps especially that
last line—“when the term ‘notice to appear’ is used elsewhere in the
statutory section, including as the trigger for the stop-time rule, it
carries with it the substantive time-and-place criteria required by
§ 1229(a)”149—plainly is discussing the requirements of § 1229(a),
untethered to the stop-time rule.
Again later, when responding to another argument that Justice
Alito made in dissent, the majority opinion also plainly construed
§ 1229(a)’s general requirements as applicable to all notices to ap-
pear.150 Justice Alito argued that the statute is better understood as
defining what makes a notice to appear “complete,” rather than as
providing that a defective notice “deprive[s] it of its essential
character as a ‘notice to appear.’”151 Even if incomplete, the notice to
appear is still a notice to appear—“much like a three-wheeled Chevy
is still a car.”152 To this, the Court responded:
Section 1229(a)(1) does not say a “notice to appear” is “complete”
when it specifies the time and place of the removal proceedings.
Rather, it defines a “notice to appear” as a “written notice” that
“specif[ies],” at a minimum, the time and place of the removal
proceedings.... Failing to specify integral information like the
time and place of removal proceedings unquestionably would
“deprive [the notice to appear] of its essential character.”153
Once again, this passage plainly construes § 1229(a)’s requirements
on their own terms—requirements that are applicable to all notices
to appear. Nothing in the passage depends on how those require-
ments interface with the stop-time rule.
148. Id. (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2114.
151. Id. at 2127 n.5 (Alito, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 2116 (majority opinion).
153. Id. at 2116-17 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting id. at 2127 n.5
(Alito, J., dissenting)).
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There is still further evidence from Pereira itself that the Court’s
construction of § 1229(a) should not be confined to cancellation
cases. Justice Sotomayor’s opinion also expressly highlighted the
need to treat identical words similarly throughout the same statu-
tory scheme.154 The opinion noted that “it is a normal rule of
statutory construction that identical words used in different parts
of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.”155 The
question in Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., a case Pereira
cited, was whether a statute that authorized prevailing parties to
recover the “compensation of interpreters” included the cost of
translating documents.156 In holding that it did not, Taniguchi
pointed out that the word “interpreter” was used elsewhere in the
same statute to refer only to oral translations of court testimony.157
Reasoning that identical words used in different parts of the same
statute should normally be construed identically, Taniguchi
concluded that prevailing parties could recover only for the costs of
oral translations, not for translations of writings.158 Numerous oth-
er cases are to the same effect.159
Those who insist that Pereira only has precedential force for
cancellation cases cannot defend the inconsistency that their
approach necessarily entails: that a notice would be insufficient
solely for purposes of triggering the stop-time rule but satisfactory
for every other purpose. That approach defies reason. As it turns
out, even some courts that have rejected applying Pereira broadly
acknowledge the inherent difficulty with defending such a cramped
reading of the decision. In Hernandez-Perez, the Sixth Circuit point-
ed out that there is “common-sense discomfort in adopting the
position that a single document labeled ‘Notice to Appear’ must
comply with a certain set of requirements for some purposes, like
triggering the stop-time rule, but with a different set of require-
ments for others.”160 Oddly, the court nevertheless rejected the
154. See id. at 2115.
155. Id. (quoting Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 571 (2012)).
156. 566 U.S. at 562.
157. See id. at 572 n.7.
158. See id. at 571, 575.
159. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995); Dep’t of Revenue of Or. v. ACF
Indus., Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 342 (1994); Sorenson v. Sec’y of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860
(1986); Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932).
160. Hernandez-Perez v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 305, 314 (6th Cir. 2018).
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noncitizen’s Pereira challenge.161 It did so because it assumed that
a defective notice has jurisdictional consequences; on that assump-
tion alone, it worried that to uphold the noncitizen’s challenge
“would have unusually broad implications.”162 But that view
conflates the threshold question of Pereira’s reach with the second-
ary issue of whether a defective notice implicates jurisdiction.163
This is the same fundamental infirmity that plagues the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Karingithi v. Whitaker, the leading appellate
court decision applying Pereira, as of this writing.164 Logically, the
first question has to be applicability, not jurisdiction. If Pereira only
applies to cancellation of removal proceedings, then the case’s juris-
dictional significance, if any, will only matter for cancellation of
removal proceedings.
But, as I have shown, the Court’s decision cannot be so narrowly
confined. To maintain that Pereira has nothing to say about
§ 1229(a) beyond its relevance to cancellation of removal cases re-
quires ignoring multiple passages in the opinion that are plainly
construing § 1229(a) directly.165 Unlike Karingithi and Hernandez-
Perez, other federal appellate courts have correctly recognized the
breadth of Pereira’s reading of § 1229(a).166
It is even more absurd to insist that the Court held that a notice
lacking time-and-place information will not interrupt cancellation
eligibility, but will be satisfactory for every other purpose. That
reading violates the firmly established statutory construction
principle of consistency that Pereira itself relied upon.167 Because no
other statutory provision delineates the requirements for notices to
appear, it makes no sense to say that a notice lacking the time-and-
place information required by § 1229(a) is insufficient only for pur-
poses of the stop-time rule, but is otherwise sufficient for all other
purposes.
161. See id. at 314-15.
162. Id. at 314.
163. See Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1159 (9th Cir. 2019).
164. See id.
165. See Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2114-16 (2018).
166. See, e.g., Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956, 961 (7th Cir. 2019) (stating that
“Pereira is not a one-way, one-day train ticket” and noting that the Court described § 1229(a)
“in definitional terms” when referring to time-and-place information required by the statute).
167. See Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2115.
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Certainly, nothing turns on the Court’s characterization of its
decision as narrow. As we have seen, except for outlier decisions
such as Bush v. Gore that many think should be bracketed as sui
generis, even self-described “narrow” decisions have some preceden-
tial reach; the question, as always, is ascertaining how far that
reach extends. To do so, what matters more than labels and self-
characterizations are the words and supporting rationales that a
higher court uses to reach its conclusions. Using these well-estab-
lished and familiar means for ascertaining precedential effect, it is
clear that both the words of the Court’s opinion and its rationales
support the conclusion that the Court’s construction of § 1229(a)
applies to all notices to appear.
2. Pereira’s Holding Did Not Turn on Lack of Actual Notice
For similar reasons, the actual notice objection—that Pereira has
no application if the noncitizen is actually made aware of when the
hearing will be through some method of notification, even if that
method has not been authorized by Congress—is equally wrong-
headed. Admittedly, the Court did make it sound as if what matters
is that the noncitizen receives actual notice of the proceedings.168
But the assumption that its decision was hinged to the government’s
efforts to provide actual notice ignores the Court’s careful parsing
of the statutory language and structure of § 1229(a).169 Put another
way, Pereira recognized two straightforward facts about the
statutory scheme: (1) all judicial removal proceedings170 start with
service of a notice to appear; and (2) all notices to appear must
include the time and place of the hearing.171 Thus, any notice to
appear that does not include the time and date of the proceedings
168. See id. (“Conveying such time-and-place information to a noncitizen is an essential
function of a notice to appear, for without it, the Government cannot reasonably expect the
noncitizen to appear for his removal proceedings.”).
169. See id. at 2114-18.
170. There are some proceedings that may be broadly categorized as “removal proceedings”
that are not initiated with a notice to appear. This did not come up in Pereira because the
noncitizen in that case was summoned to a judicial removal proceeding under § 1229a, id. at
2117-18, which is far and away the most common type of removal proceeding. These other
proceedings include expedited removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c)(1), reinstated removal
proceedings, id. § 1231(a)(5), and administrative removal proceedings, id. § 1228(b)(1), all of
which use something other than a notice to appear under § 1229(a) to initiate the proceedings.
171. Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2117-18.
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fails to satisfy the statute.172 So, yes, giving notice is an essential
function of the notice to appear.173 But the Court is also just as
plainly saying that with § 1229, Congress unambiguously required
that that essential function be performed by a specific document:
the notice to appear.174
Moreover, the problem with insisting that a Pereira defect should
always be excused if the noncitizen actually received notice of the
removal proceedings is that it fails to recognize circumstances when
we should not ignore a notice-giver’s failure to comply with all legal
requirements—separate and apart from whether actual notice was
received. That will especially be true when the societal values fur-
thered by insisting on compliance with the law heavily outweigh the
administrative costs of full compliance with all technical legal
requirements. Those societal values are most compelling in the first
and second case types discussed below.175
Finally, and perhaps most self-evidently, the Court in Pereira
expressly rejected prior judicial construction of § 1229 as turning on
whether the noncitizen actually received notice. Recall that, before
Pereira, a number of courts read § 1229 exactly as the government
did; even after Pereira, some courts, including the BIA, insist it can
be read that way.176 That is, these courts have held that § 1229’s
notice requirements can be satisfied in two documents: a notice to
appear and a subsequently issued notice of hearing that includes
the actual hearing date.177 Post-Pereira, the BIA178 and at least one
federal appellate court179 have reached the same conclusion. But this
is exactly the construction of § 1229 that Pereira rejected.180 Both
the majority opinion and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence specifically
call out these earlier cases for having interpreted the statute
differently than the Court was construing it.181 Obviously, in light
172. See id.
173. Id. at 2114.
174. See id.
175. See infra Parts III.C.1-2.
176. See Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. 441, 443 (B.I.A. 2018).
177. Id. at 447.
178. Mendoza-Hernandez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 520, 523 (B.I.A. 2019) (en banc).
179. Santos-Santos v. Barr, 917 F.3d 486, 492 (6th Cir. 2019).
180. Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2113-14.
181. See id. at 2113 n.4 (citing the Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits as compared to the Third Circuit in Orozco-Velasquez, the only circuit court pre-
Pereira to have held that the stop-time rule was only triggered by a notice to appear that
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of Pereira’s rejection of their reasoning, these cases are no longer
good law.182
3. Pereira’s Silence on Jurisdiction Does Not Reveal Its 
Acknowledgement that Jurisdiction Existed
That leaves one remaining loose thread to consider. Recall that
some proponents of reading Pereira narrowly point to the fact that
the Court did not invalidate the underlying removal proceedings.183
This is said to be proof that it did not regard a defective notice as
insufficient to vest jurisdiction.184 There are two responses to this
line of thinking.
First, because the question of jurisdiction under § 1003.14 was
not raised by either party in Pereira, the Court’s decision does not
tell us anything about what the Justices might have thought if the
question had been raised. For more than two centuries, the Court
has made it clear that no precedential effect can be read into the
possibility of “unaddressed jurisdictional defects.”185 Far more
recently, it has repeated the admonition that “[w]hen a potential
jurisdictional defect is neither noted nor discussed in a federal
decision, the decision does not stand for the proposition that no
defect existed.”186 As the Court further noted in Winn, “When
questions of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior decisions sub
silentio, this Court has never considered itself bound when a
subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue before us.”187
“Even as to our own judicial power or jurisdiction,” the Court ob-
served in yet another case, “this Court has followed the lead of Mr.
satisfied all of § 1229(a)’s requirements); id. at 2120 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing pre-
Pereira decisions that, following the BIA’s decision in Camarillo, construed § 1229 as allowing
a two-step notice process, and noting that the Court “correctly concludes today that those
holdings were wrong because the BIA’s interpretation finds little support in the statute’s
text”).
182. See Lopez v. Barr, 925 F.3d 396, 339-400 (9th Cir. 2019) (recognizing that pre-Pereira
cases approving a two-step notice procedure have been “effectively overruled”).
183. See Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 443.
184. See id. at 444-45.
185. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352 n.2 (1996); accord United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 159, 172 (1805) (“No question was made, in that case, as to the jurisdiction. It passed
sub silentio, and the court does not consider itself as bound by that case.”).
186. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 144 (2011).
187. Id. (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 535 n.5 (1974)).
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Chief Justice Marshall who held that this Court is not bound by a
prior exercise of jurisdiction in a case where it was not questioned
and it was passed sub silentio.”188
The second response, perhaps even more straightforward, is that
a defective notice has no relevance to the immigration court’s
subject matter jurisdiction—or, for that matter, to its territorial
jurisdiction over noncitizens—as Part III.A explains.
III. CONSEQUENCES OF A DEFECTIVE NOTICE
Having concluded that Pereira’s construction of § 1229(a) applies
to all notices to appear, it is still necessary to consider how this
conclusion matters. I begin by considering, but ultimately rejecting,
the predominant view that a defect in notice constitutes a non-
waivable defect in the immigration court’s subject matter jurisdic-
tion or, alternatively, that a defective notice is relevant to its
territorial jurisdiction over noncitizens. Thereafter, I show that
Pereira challenges should turn on three doctrinal considerations:
retroactivity, forfeiture, and harmless error.
A. Defective Notice and Jurisdiction
Many immigration advocates have argued, and some lower courts
have agreed, that a notice without the time and date of the removal
proceedings is insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on
the immigration court.189 It is perhaps not surprising that Pereira’s
holding has been thought to have jurisdictional implications, given
the language of the regulation in § 1003.14: “Jurisdiction vests, and
188. United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952); accord Webster
v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925) (“Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought
to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided
as to constitute precedents.”).
189. See United States v. Virgen-Ponce, 320 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1166 (E.D. Wash. 2018)
(granting detained alien’s motion to dismiss indictment on basis that, under Pereira,
immigration court lacked jurisdiction over removal proceedings initiated by notice to appear
that did not include the date and time of the removal proceedings); Motion to Dismiss at 9,
Ex. C., Virgen-Ponce, 320 F. Supp. 3d 1164 (E.D. Wash. 2018) (No. 2:10-CR-00092) (citing two
decisions by immigration judges in Seattle and Phoenix); Johnson, supra note 13, at 6; see also
United States v. Zapata-Cortinas, No. SA-18-CR-00343-OLG, 2018 WL 4770868, at *5 (W.D.
Tex. Oct. 2, 2018); United States v. Pedroza-Rocha, No. EP-18-CR-1286-DB, 2018 WL
6629649, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2018).
38 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:001
proceedings before an Immigration Judge commence, when a
charging document is filed with the Immigration Court by the
[INS].”190
It makes some sense that advocates for an expansive reading
would want Pereira to have subject matter jurisdiction implications.
At least for Article III courts, a defect in subject matter jurisdiction
is considered non-waivable, meaning that it can be raised at any
time during the trial of the case, or even afterwards on direct
appeal.191 Moreover, federal courts are obligated to confirm the
existence of their subject matter jurisdiction and, if they find it
lacking, dismiss sua sponte, regardless of whether the parties raise
it on their own.192
It bears saying, however, that treating Pereira as a subject matter
jurisdiction problem overlooks that defects in subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be attacked collaterally, either as to Article III193
or Article I courts.194 As a result, the intended benefits of framing a
Pereira challenge as implicating the immigration court’s subject
matter jurisdiction—even if it had such implications—could only be
enjoyed by noncitizens in currently pending or future proceedings.
An alternative framing that would treat a defective notice as going
to the immigration court’s personal jurisdiction might permit
collateral attacks on final judgments (assuming that we graft our
settled conceptions of state and federal court territorial jurisdiction
on immigration courts) but, at bottom, that argument is predicated
on the same assumption that a defective notice to appear implicates
some form of jurisdiction. As I will show, this fundamental assump-
tion is wrong.
190. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) (2019).
191. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702
(1982).
192. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).
193. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 n.9 (2004).
194. See, e.g., Nekoba v. Haw. Nat’l Bancshares, Inc. (In re Sunra Coffee, LLC), BAP No.
HI-11-1635-PaJuH, 2012 WL 3590754, at *4 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug. 21, 2012) (holding that
subject matter attack on bankruptcy court judgment could not be made collaterally).
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1. A Defective Notice Does Not Bear on the Immigration
Court’s Subject Matter Jurisdiction
As intuitive as it might seem at first blush, it does not follow that
because the agency regulation uses the word “jurisdiction,” a notice
that lacks the time and place of the proceedings constitutes a juris-
dictional defect. The primary difficulty with this view is that a
defective notice bears no relevance to the immigration court’s
subject matter jurisdiction over the proceedings.
Subject matter jurisdiction for any court—whether for an Article
III court, an Article I “legislative court,” or even an administrative
tribunal—refers to the adjudicatory authority, or competence, of the
court to act.195 That authority is always derived from, and dependent
on, the enabling legislation that the legislature has promulgated
“delineating the classes of cases” that the court can hear.196 Just as
Congress set the parameters of the authority it vested in Article III
courts in various statutory grants of original jurisdiction,197 it did
the same for immigration courts. But the relevant statute is not
§ 1229. It is § 1229a. And the language of § 1229a(a)(1) is clear in
delineating the classes of cases that an immigration court can hear:
“An immigration judge shall conduct proceedings for deciding the
inadmissibility or deportability of an alien.”198 This is the entire
scope of an immigration court’s subject matter jurisdictional au-
thority.
But what about the fact that the regulation links jurisdiction to
proper notice?199 Whatever the agency meant when it adopted that
regulation (and it is very unlikely that it meant to link the notice to
appear to the immigration court’s subject matter jurisdiction),
nothing turns on the regulation’s use of the word “jurisdiction.”200
195. See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 160 (2010) (“‘Jurisdiction’ refers to
‘a court’s adjudicatory authority.’”) (quoting Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455); Bowles v. Russell, 551
U.S. 205, 213 (2007) (noting that “the notion of ‘subject-matter’ jurisdiction obviously extends
to ‘classes of cases ... falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority’”) (internal citations
omitted).
196. Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 160.
197. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1332 (2012). Of course, all such enabling legislation for
federal district courts, in turn, derives from the constitutional grant of authority in Article III.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
198.  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2012).
199. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) (2019).
200. Although the authority citation in the Federal Register for § 1003.14 references three
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What matters is not the agency’s intent; it is Congress’s.201 Indeed,
even if the agency wanted to treat a defective notice as divesting the
immigration court of subject matter jurisdiction, it could not do so
if Congress has not predicated subject matter jurisdiction on proper
notice.
In Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engi-
neers & Trainmen General Committee of Adjustment, the Supreme
Court held that administrative agencies (in Union Pacific the
agency was the National Railroad Adjustment Board) cannot curtail
their own jurisdiction by regulations or by judicial decision.202
Congress vested the Board with subject matter jurisdiction to adju-
dicate grievances of railroad employees that remain unresolved
after internal dispute resolution procedures.203 A separate statute
imposed a settlement conference requirement on the parties.204
Union Pacific rejected the Board’s view that the failure to satisfy
the conference requirement divested the Board of jurisdiction: “By
presuming authority to declare procedural rules ‘jurisdictional,’ the
panel failed ‘to conform, or confine itself, to matters [Congress
statutory sections (8 U.S.C. §§ 1103, 1229, 1229a), see 68 Fed. Reg. 9830, 9832 (Feb. 28, 2003),
§ 1229 is unquestionably the most direct authority on which the relevant regulatory
subsection, § 1003.14(a), is based. No other statutory provision defines or further delineates
the notice to appear requirement; § 1229(a) does so expressly. Indeed, the title of the
section—“Initiation of Removal Proceedings,” which was the heading Congress used in section
239 of the Immigration and Nationality Act—Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-587 (1996)
underscores that it is the central authority on which § 1003.14, which itself is captioned
“Jurisdiction and commencement of proceedings,” is based. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14; see also INS
v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 189 (1991) (“[T]he title of a statute or
section can aid in resolving an ambiguity in the legislation’s text.”); Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490
U.S. 714, 723 (1989) (“[A]ny possible ambiguity is resolved against respondents by the title
of [the statute].”). In other words, the agency almost certainly meant to mirror Congress’s
intent in treating the notice to appear as a charging document, akin to the summons that is
issued in civil cases by which a civil defendant is notified of the action and directed to file its
answer to the plaintiff ’s petition or complaint.
201. See Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 825 (1980) (“We must also reject any
suggestion that the [agency] may adopt regulations that are inconsistent with the statutory
mandate. As we have held on prior occasions, its ‘interpretation’ of the statute cannot
supersede the language chosen by Congress.”); Contreras-Bocanegra v. Holder, 678 F.3d 811,
819 (10th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Prestol Espinal v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 653 F.3d 213, 218 (3d
Cir. 2011); Schneider v. Chertoff, 450 F.3d 944, 954-55 (9th Cir. 2006); Scheerer v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 445 F.3d 1311, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2006).
202. 558 U.S. 67, 71-72 (2009).
203. See id. at 71.
204. See id. at 72.
2019] PEREIRA’S AFTERSHOCKS 41
placed] within the scope of [the Board’s] jurisdiction.’”205 Thus, just
as in Union Pacific, § 1003.14 cannot predicate subject matter juris-
diction on proper notice if Congress has not done so.
And it is clear that Congress has not done so. As we have seen, in
§ 1229a Congress placed certain matters within the scope of the
immigration court’s jurisdiction.206 Notably, however, it has not
expressly tethered the exercise of jurisdiction to satisfaction of the
separate statutory requirements for notices to appear. It is hardly
surprising that Congress did not explicitly link the notice to appear
to the immigration court’s jurisdiction. The notice to appear is akin
to a summons or citation that is used in state and federal civil cases
to notify civil defendants that they have been sued, or to the type of
charging document that is used in criminal proceedings. Indeed, the
characterization of a notice to appear as a “charging document” was
accepted, at least arguendo, by both the majority and the dissent in
Pereira.207
The Court has frequently wrestled with distinguishing between
jurisdictional rules and “claim-processing” rules.208 In many of these
cases, claim-processing rules referred to substantive elements of
the relevant claim for relief.209 For instance, in Arbaugh, the ques-
tion was whether the “fifteen or more employees” limitation for Title
VII claims was jurisdictional.210 The Court held that it was not.211 In
other cases, such as Union Pacific, the Court drew a line between
jurisdiction and rules governing “the presentation and processing of
claims.”212 In all of the cases, the dividing line was drawn by looking
to whether Congress expressly treated the rule as jurisdictional.213
205. Id. at 71 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 153 (2012)).
206. See generally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229-1229(b).
207. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2115 n.7 (2018); id. at 2128 (Alito, J., dissenting).
208. See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161 (2010) (noting that “the
distinction between jurisdictional conditions and claim-processing rules can be confusing in
practice” and that “[c]ourts—including this Court—have sometimes mischaracterized claim-
processing rules or elements of a cause of action as jurisdictional limitations”).
209. See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 503 (2006).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 504.
212. Union Pacific R.R. v. Bd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of
Adjustment, 558 U.S. 61, 71 (2009).
213. See, e.g., Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515-16 (“If the Legislature clearly states that a thresh-
old limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will
be duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue. But when Congress does not
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There certainly are situations when the immigration court will
lack subject matter jurisdiction. For instance, § 1229a does not give
authority to the immigration courts to decide cases involving United
States citizens; the statute only extends jurisdiction to decide cases
involving an alien.214 As the Supreme Court has observed, “alienage
is a jurisdictional fact.”215 And an assertion of U.S. citizenship “is
thus a denial of an essential jurisdictional fact.”216 Note also that
§ 1229a limits the subject matter jurisdiction of the immigration
courts to deciding questions of “inadmissibility or deportability.”217
Cases that involve any other questions would be outside the scope
of this grant of jurisdiction. To use an outlandish example, imagine
that someone tried to file a breach of contract civil action with the
immigration court. If the clerk did not outright reject it, as we would
expect, the immigration judge certainly should dismiss it on subject
matter grounds. Immigration courts cannot resolve contract
disputes any more than they can declare the validity of a patent or
probate a will. These cases concern issues other than the inadmissi-
bility and deportability of aliens, which is the extent of the subject
matter jurisdiction that Congress has given to the immigration
courts.218 If the courts tried to do anything else, they would be acting
ultra vires.
For present purposes, there is no difficulty in distinguishing
between Congress’s grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the immi-
gration courts, and the separate statutory requirements for notices
to appear, which indisputably are not expressly treated as jurisdic-
tional requirements. This is exactly what the Seventh Circuit had
in mind in Ortiz-Santiago when it pointed to Arbaugh and its
progeny and concluded that § 1229(a) “says nothing about the
agency’s jurisdiction.”219 And as for the fact that the administrative
rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction
as nonjurisdictional in character.” (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)).
214. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2012).
215. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153 (1923); see also Gonzalez-
Alarcon v. Macias, 884 F.3d 1266, 1280 (10th Cir. 2018) (“[A]lienage is also a jurisdictional
prerequisite ... because immigration judges and the Board do not have subject-matter
jurisdiction over United States citizens.”) (emphasis omitted) (citing Iasu v. Smith, 511 F.3d
881, 893 (9th Cir. 2007)).
216. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
217. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1).
218. See id.
219. Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956, 963 (7th Cir. 2019).
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regulation in § 1003.14 describes when jurisdiction vests? Irrele-
vant, the Seventh Circuit correctly concluded. “While an agency may
adopt rules and processes to maintain order, it cannot define the
scope of its power to hear cases.... [W]hen the agency creates the
rules for its adjudicatory proceedings, it must act within the limits
that Congress gave it.”220
Finally, the conclusion that § 1229(a)’s requirements are more
like claims-processing rules, and are not jurisdictional, is further
bolstered by a decision the Court handed down almost a year to the
day after Pereira. The question in Fort Bend County v. Davis was
whether Title VII’s charge-filing precondition to suit is a jurisdic-
tional requirement.221 Certainly, the statute is clear that in order to
maintain a Title VII employment discrimination action in court, a
complainant must first file an administrative charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission.222 But that charge-filing
requirement, while mandatory, does not have any effect on the
court’s jurisdiction, as the Court explained in Fort Bend County,
further elaborating on its earlier decisions.223
Jurisdictional requirements are “generally reserved to describe
the classes of cases a court may entertain (subject-matter jurisdic-
tion) or the persons over whom a court may exercise adjudicatory
authority (personal jurisdiction).”224 Congress can enact jurisdic-
tional requirements, the Court recognized, “by incorporating them
into a jurisdictional provision,” such as Congress has done with the
amount-in-controversy requirement for federal court diversity juris-
diction.225 The Court will also treat a requirement as jurisdictional
when a “long line” of prior Supreme Court decisions have treated it
that way.226 In short, only when Congress “clearly states” that a re-
quirement is jurisdictional should courts treat it as such. But “when
Congress does not rank a [prescription] as jurisdictional, courts
should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.”227
220. Id.
221. 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1846 (2019).
222. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)).
223. Id. at 1849-51.
224. Id. at 1846.
225. Id. at 1849 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)).
226. Id. (citing cases).
227. Id. at 1850 (alteration in original).
44 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:001
Having recited its familiar framework for distinguishing jurisdic-
tional from nonjurisdictional rules, the Court in Fort Bend County
concluded that prerequisites to suit “like Title VII’s charge-filing
instruction are not of that character; they are properly ranked
among the array of claim-processing rules that must be timely
raised to come into play.”228 A claim-processing rule may be “manda-
tory” in the sense that a court must enforce the rule if a party
“properly raise[s] it. But an objection based on a mandatory claim-
processing rule may be forfeited ‘if the party asserting the rule waits
too long to raise the point.’”229
Fort Bend County, then, makes even clearer what should already
have been apparent to anyone wading into the debate over Pereira’s
jurisdictional import. The government’s failure to satisfy all of
§ 1229(a)’s requirements in the notice to appear may provide a basis
to challenge the propriety of notice, but that failure does not impli-
cate the immigration court’s subject matter jurisdiction.230
2. A Defective Notice Also Does Not Implicate the Immigration
Court’s Personal Jurisdiction
That a defective notice to appear also does not implicate the
immigration court’s personal jurisdiction is equally plain. While it
is possible for a legislative body to link the issuance of notice to the
exercise of territorial jurisdiction, Congress has not done so here.
Section 1229(a) requires that a notice to appear be used to com-
mence removal proceedings, as both its title—“Initiation of removal
proceedings”—and its text reflect.231 Notably, the section does not
make issuance of the notice a requirement to establish territorial
jurisdiction.232
228. Id. at 1846.
229. Id. at 1849 (internal citations omitted).
230. See Kohli v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting the argument
that an alleged defect in the notice to appear deprived the immigration court of jurisdiction);
1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 4.02[3] (Matthew Bender ed., 3d
ed. 2019) (noting that service under Rule 4 relates to personal, not subject matter,
jurisdiction).
231. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (2012) (“In removal proceedings under section 1229a of this title,
written notice (in this section referred to as a ‘notice to appear’) shall be given.”).
232. See id.
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And the reason that Congress did not make the immigration
court’s territorial jurisdiction dependent on issuance of the notice is
that no such linkage is necessary. Because immigration judges
decide whether to admit or deport noncitizens, the physical presence
of noncitizens in the country (or their consent, when it comes to
applications for admission) is all that is needed to confer power over
them.233 In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the Court held that “[t]he ‘body’
or identity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil pro-
ceeding is never itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest,
even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest ... occurred.”234 The
noncitizen in Lopez-Mendoza objected to being summoned to appear
at a deportation hearing on the grounds that he was unlawfully
arrested.235 But the Court rejected his objection, noting that the
“mere fact of an illegal arrest has no bearing on a subsequent
deportation proceeding.”236 Although Lopez-Mendoza has generated
a great deal of confusion regarding whether it created an eviden-
tiary rule that insulated certain identity-based evidence from
suppression,237 courts and commentators have long accepted that it
does articulate a rule of personal jurisdiction for the immigration
courts.238 Lopez-Mendoza, thus, can be read to foreclose any argu-
ment that a defect in the notice to appear impacts the personal
jurisdictional authority of the immigration court over the non-
citizen.239
233. See Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 199 (E.D. Pa.
1974) (“[T]he United States is deemed to have personal jurisdiction over any defendant within
the United States.”); 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 1068.1 n.21 (4th ed. 2018) (“Despite the almost complete abandonment of territoriality as
a limitation on state jurisdictional powers, the holding of Pennoyer v. Neff that a state may
exercise personal jurisdiction over anyone found within its territory remains good law.”
(citation omitted)). See generally Peter L. Markowitz & Lindsay C. Nash, Constitutional
Venue, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1153, 1204 n.249 (2014).
234. 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1984).
235. Id. at 1034.
236. Id. at 1040 (quoting Lopez-Mendoza, No. AZZ 45Z 208 (B.I.A. 1979)).
237. See, e.g., United States v. Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d 224, 228 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting that
Lopez-Mendoza’s identity statement “has bedeviled and divided our sister circuits”).
238. See, e.g., Pretzantzin v. Holder, 736 F.3d 641, 646-47 (2d Cir. 2013); see also David
Antón Armendáriz, On the Border Patrol and Its Use of Illegal Roving Patrol Stops, 14
SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. ON MINORITY ISSUES 553, 573 n.125 (2012).
239. Even if the minimum contacts analysis that applies to state and federal courts is
appropriate to use to determine the territorial jurisdiction of immigration courts, because they
are created by Congress, not the states, the relevant sovereign for territorial jurisdiction
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B. Retroactivity, Forfeiture, and Prejudice
We have seen that a notice to appear that lacks the proceeding’s
time and place does not implicate either the subject matter or per-
sonal jurisdictional authority of the immigration court. Unfortu-
nately, the predominant approach among courts and advocates has
been to examine Pereira challenges solely in terms of whether a de-
fective notice has jurisdictional consequences.240 This is unfortunate
because courts have conflated the question of whether a Pereira
defect implicates jurisdiction with whether it has any consequences
at all. Cases such as the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Karingithi
illustrate the kind of tunnel vision courts have shown in applying
Pereira.241
It does not follow, however, from the (correct) conclusion that
Pereira is irrelevant to jurisdiction that there are no consequences
if the government has served a defective notice. In the following
Sections, I show that whether a Pereira challenge can be success-
fully made, and how, turns on three factors: Pereira’s applicability,
either prospectively or retrospectively;242 the possibility of for-
feiture;243 and, finally, the noncitizen’s ability to demonstrate
prejudice (i.e., harmful error), resulting from service of a defective
notice.244
1. Retroactivity
The first factor that will sometimes govern whether a Pereira
challenge can be successfully made is whether the Court’s decision
can be applied retroactively. Although this was not always the
case,245 today the general starting presumption is that new judicial
purposes is the United States. See Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A.,
119 F.3d 935, 946 n.21 (11th Cir. 1997). Thus, the relevant inquiry would be whether the
noncitizen has contacts with the country as a whole. See id. Because § 1229(a) operates as a
nationwide service of process statute, personal jurisdiction may be said to obtain over any
noncitizen who has minimum contacts with the United States as a whole. See Omni Capital
Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987).
240. See, e.g., Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2019).
241. See id.
242. See infra Part III.B.1.
243. See infra Part III.B.2.
244. See infra Part III.B.3.
245. See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Loving Retroactivity, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 383, 390
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decisions apply retroactively to all pending cases.246 In Teague v.
Lane and its progeny, the Court made clear that under certain
circumstances judicial decisions can apply retroactively in criminal
cases that are still on direct appeal.247 Thereafter, with regard to
civil retroactivity, in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, the
Court observed:
When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties
before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law
and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on
direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such
events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule.248
Correlatively, the general rule against retroactivity for fully
closed cases is quite clear, both as to criminal249 and civil250 cases. As
Justice Harlan noted in his concurrence in United States v. Estate
of Donnelly, a judicial decision is not applied retroactively to any
case that has reached
(2018) (“Before the twentieth century, the concept of adjudicative retroactivity ... was
essentially unknown.”).
246. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Deciding When to Decide: How Appellate Procedure
Distributes the Costs of Legal Change, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 211 (2011) (noting that “the
general rule is that new decisions apply retroactively, at least to all cases that are still
pending on appeal”).
247. See 489 U.S. 288, 300-01 (1989). Teague distinguished between new rules, which are
not applied retroactively, and the application of settled rules, which are. See id. That
distinction has often proven vexing. See, e.g., Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 347-49,
353-55 (2013). It poses no obstacle for present purposes because Pereira construed statutory
language, it did not announce a new rule. See Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory Is a
Dangerous Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075, 1076 (1999)
(referring to the retroactivity of judicial interpretations of statutes and noting that “[s]ince
an unchanging statute backs the judicial interpretations, it makes sense to say that while
decisions may change, the law remains the same. An overruled decision is simply wrong; it
is not and was never the law”).
248. 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993).
249. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351-52 (2004) (“When a decision of this Court
results in a ‘new rule,’ that rule applies to all criminal cases still pending on direct review. As
to convictions that are already final, however, the rule applies only in limited circumstances.”
(citation omitted)); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (“[A] new rule for the
conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal,
pending on direct review or not yet final.”).
250. See, e.g., Chicot Cty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940)
(refusing to retroactively apply decision that subsequently declared applicable federal statute
unconstitutional).
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such a degree of finality that the rights of the parties should be
considered frozen. Just as in the criminal field the crucial
moment is, for most cases, the time when a conviction has
become final ... so in the civil area that moment should be when
the transaction is beyond challenge either because the statute of
limitations has run or the rights of the parties have been fixed
by litigation and have become res judicata.251
The Court put it likewise in Federated Department Stores, Inc. v.
Moitie: “[T]he res judicata consequences of a final, unappealed judg-
ment on the merits [cannot be] altered by the fact that the judgment
may have been wrong or rested on a legal principle subsequently
overruled in another case.”252 Quoting its earlier decision in Reed v.
Allen, Moitie recognized that “[t]he indulgence of a contrary view
would result in creating elements of uncertainty and confusion and
in undermining the conclusive character of judgments, consequences
which it was the very purpose of the doctrine of res judicata to
avert.”253 In short, as we saw above, the general rule is that judicial
retroactivity extends no further than to “cases still open on direct
review.”254
251. 397 U.S. 286, 296 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
252. 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981) (emphasis added).
253. Id. at 398-99 (alteration in original) (quoting Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 201 (1932)).
254. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993). It might be noted that the
courts, on some occasions, do apply subsequent changes in decisional law retroactively even
as to closed cases. Perhaps the most prominent recent example that can be cited is Lugo-
Resendez v. Lynch. See 831 F.3d 337, 344 (5th Cir. 2016). In that case, a noncitizen pleaded
guilty in state court to a felony possession of less than one gram of a controlled substance. Id.
at 339. Thereafter, the government commenced removal proceedings against him on the basis
that his state conviction qualified as an aggravated felony. Id. The noncitizen did not
challenge the basis for his removal and a removal order was entered. Id. More than a decade
later, the noncitizen filed a motion to reopen under § 1229a(c)(7), citing as grounds a Supreme
Court decision that came out several years after the noncitizen was removed. Id. In it, the
Court held that simple possession does not qualify as aggravated felony for immigration
purposes. Id.
The Fifth Circuit’s primary holding in Lugo-Resendez was that the noncitizen’s motion to
reopen was not untimely because equitable tolling applied to the ninety-day deadline for filing
a motion to reopen under § 1229a(c)(7)—joining the majority of courts that similarly have
recognized that the deadline for filing a statutory motion to reopen can be extended by
equitable tolling. Id. at 343-44. Ultimately, Lugo-Resendez did not decide whether the
deadline should be equitably tolled in the case. Id. at 344. However, by remanding the case
to the BIA to decide whether the deadline should be equitably tolled, the Fifth Circuit
appeared to implicitly recognize that the subsequent changes in decisional law could apply
retroactively, even though the effect of doing so would be to reopen a removal order entered
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Notwithstanding the general rule against retroactivity as to fully
resolved cases, there are two statutory sections applicable to certain
removal proceedings that arguably authorize courts to retroactively
apply subsequent judicial decisions to fully resolved cases. Rather
than discuss those here, I will address the two statutory exceptions
when we consider the last case type in which a Pereira challenge
may arise, in Part III.C, below.
2. Forfeiture
A second factor that will sometimes be relevant in deciding
whether a Pereira challenge can succeed is whether the noncitizen
timely raised a challenge to the notice. A generally recognized prin-
ciple of law is that litigants must timely raise legal points or they
are forfeited.255 Forfeiture is “the failure to make timely assertion of
the right.”256
The tricky question is whether to regard an argument as forfeited
if it was not then available to be made under the existing law. On
the one hand, it seems intuitively right to say that a party cannot
be said to have forfeited an argument if the governing cases
previously rejected it and there was no good faith basis for asserting
thirteen years earlier. See id.
While Lugo-Resendez indicates that courts sometimes will retroactively apply subsequent
decisions that change the law to fully final cases, id. at 339, 343-44, it is reasonable to read
the Fifth Circuit’s decision narrowly. At most, the case may stand for the proposition that a
change in criminal status, resulting from subsequent judicial classification of a crime, must
be applied retroactively as a matter of constitutional due process. See id. Even under the
standard Teague analysis, new substantive rules do apply retroactively even to closed cases.
See Schriro, 542 U.S. at 351-52. It is new procedural rules that do not apply after a case is
closed. See id. at 352. A substantive rule would be something like a rule that the state cannot
criminalize flag burning or cannot execute minors. (Admittedly, Teague is about criminal
cases. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299-301 (1989)).
255. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944) (“No procedural principle is more
familiar to this Court than that a ... right may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases
by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to
determine it.” (citations omitted)). Forfeiture is related to but said to be distinct from waiver,
which involves the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” Kontrick
v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 458 n.13 (2004) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733
(1993)). Of course, a litigant’s failure to timely assert a right may have been intentional, so
there is much overlap between the two and the Supreme Court has pointed out that the words
are often used interchangeably. See id. That said, for purposes of this Article, I will continue
to use the word forfeiture for consistency’s sake.
256. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 444.
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otherwise.257 And, indeed, there is a doctrine referred to as the
intervening law exception (it is sometimes also called the superven-
ing decision exception) that captures this intuition.258 However
named, the exception finds support in the Supreme Court’s decision
in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, which held that the failure to raise
a constitutional defense did not amount to forfeiture because the
basis for the defense came from a later decision.259 The animating
idea seems entirely sensible: we do not want to incentivize lawyers
to make groundless arguments that are foreclosed by existing law.260
Note though, that the intervening law exception to forfeiture readily
accommodates nonfrivolous arguments that existing law is wrong
and should be changed.261 That is especially important, of course,
when it comes to fundamental rights. Think of arguments that
lawyers had to make to convince the Court to overturn its imprima-
tur of the loathsome separate-but-equal doctrine.262
Somewhat surprisingly, the intervening law exception is not uni-
versally accepted. Numerous courts, especially in civil cases, use the
plain error standard of review to refuse to consider arguments not
previously raised, even when the argument is based on a subse-
quent judicial change in the law.263 However, even among those
courts that consider unraised issues to be forfeited, there usually is
recognition, following Butts, that forfeiture should not be found if
“‘there was strong precedent’ prior to the change ... such that the
failure to raise the issue was not unreasonable and the opposing
257. Cf., e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(g)(2) (“[A] party that makes a motion under this rule must
not make another motion under this rule raising a defense or objection that was available to
the party but omitted from its earlier motion.”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(f) advisory committee’s
note to 1974 amendment (“[F]ailure [by a party] to raise the objections or make the requests
[which must be made prior to trial] constitutes a waiver thereof.”).
258. See Cobalt Boats, LLC v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 254 F. Supp. 3d 836, 838 (E.D. Va.
2017).
259. 388 U.S. 130, 143 (1967).
260. See Bruhl, supra note 246, at 213 (“[I]t does not seem fruitful to encourage attorneys
to raise a raft of futile arguments that the district judge has no choice but to reject.”).
261. Cf., e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2) (approving the assertion of claims, defenses, and other
legal contentions that “are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law”).
262. For an excellent discussion of the litigation strategy that led to Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD
OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (2004).
263. See, e.g., Holland v. Big River Minerals Corp., 181 F.3d 597, 605 (4th Cir. 1999).
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party was not prejudiced by the failure to raise the issue sooner.”264
Still others recognize that there should be no forfeiture when the
law “was so well-settled at the time of trial that any attempt to chal-
lenge it would have appeared pointless” prior to the subsequent
judicial change in the law.265 Courts have also accepted that when
there has been an intervening adjudicative change in the law, there
has been no forfeiture when the issues that were not raised “are
questions of law, the proper resolution of which are beyond reason-
able doubt, and the failure to address the issues would result in a
miscarriage of justice.”266
Because the law of forfeiture is not as well settled as it should be,
a number of courts have been willing to find arguments forfeited
even when they are based on subsequent adjudicative changes to
the law. Thus, even though Ortiz-Santiago correctly recognized that
Pereira’s construction of § 1229(a) applies to all notices to appear
and that the immigration court’s subsequent mailing of a notice of
hearing does not cure a defect in the original notice to appear, the
Seventh Circuit nevertheless concluded that the noncitizen forfeited
his right to raise a Pereira challenge.267 The court’s analysis is hard
to defend. After all, Pereira’s construction of § 1229 was previously
rejected by almost every other intermediate appellate court,
including the Seventh Circuit itself.268 The court candidly acknowl-
edged that “[w]e had rejected the exact argument Ortiz-Santiago
sought to make about section 1229(a)’s time-and-place information
requirement” and that “Pereira thus represented a genuine change
in circumstances,” normally sufficient to avoid forfeiture.269 But the
court nevertheless concluded that in Ortiz-Santiago’s case “there
were signs that a meritorious argument could be raised [before
Pereira].”270
What were these signs? The primary one, apparently, was that he
could have noted “the clear statutory text,” even though the court
264. Id. at 605-06 (quoting Curtiz Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 143 (1967)).
265. United States v. Washington, 12 F.3d 1128, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also, e.g., Brown
v. M&M/Mars, 883 F.2d 505, 512-13 (7th Cir. 1989).
266. Petrini v. Howard, 918 F.2d 1482, 1483 n.4 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
267. Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956, 961, 964 (7th Cir. 2019).
268. See, e.g., Dababneh v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 2006); Haider v. Gonzales,
438 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2005).
269. Ortiz-Santiago, 924 F.3d at 964.
270. Id.
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just got through reminding readers that its own prior construction
of the language in § 1229(a) rejected the noncitizen’s argument that
the government’s failure to provide time-and-place information in
the notice to appear failed to interrupt the period of continuous
presence for cancellation of removal eligibility.271 Indeed, back then,
when it rejected the noncitizen’s argument that Congress did not
intend a defective notice to appear to interrupt the continuous
presence clock, Dababneh concluded that § 1229(a)’s language was
“clear.”272
The only other “sign” the Seventh Circuit said that the noncitizen
in Ortiz-Santiago should have seen is equally suspect. According to
the court, although every other appellate court had firmly rejected
the argument that a notice lacking time-and-place information was
insufficient, Ortiz-Santiago “could have noted” that the Third
Circuit disagreed.273 Yet, the Seventh Circuit had previously said,
“Our duty is to independently decide our own cases, which some-
times results in disagreements with decisions of the other
circuits.”274 To be sure, in a nonprecedential decision the Court
refused to impose sanctions when a litigant, citing other circuit
authorities that contradict Seventh Circuit controlling precedent,
argued for a modification of the law.275 But that is an awfully thin
reed to expect other litigants to hang on to, especially when the
circuit consistently rejected all prior efforts to reject Dababneh.276
Indeed, although the Seventh Circuit thought it important that the
Third Circuit’s decision in Orozco-Velasquez was decided before
Ortiz-Santiago’s case, it made no mention that it repeatedly relied
on its decision in Dababneh to reject arguments challenging the
sufficiency of a defective notice to appear.277
271. Id. at 960, 964 (citing Dababneh, 471 F.3d at 810).
272. Dababneh, 471 F.3d at 810.
273. Ortiz-Santiago, 924 F.3d at 964.
274. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Peña, 44 F.3d 437, 443 (7th Cir. 1994).
275. Perfection Bakeries, Inc. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local Union No. 414,
No. 03-3392, 2004 WL 1662253, at *3-4 (7th Cir. July 14, 2004).
276. See, e.g., Yi Di Wang v. Holder, 759 F.3d 670, 673-74 (7th Cir. 2014); Mozdzen v.
Holder, 622 F.3d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 2010).
277. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Berdin v. Holder, 618 F.3d 647, 653 (7th Cir. 2010) ("The fact that
the NTA left the time and date of a deportation hearing to be determined at a future date did
not render it defective because subsequent documents set out the requisite information."
(citing Dababneh, 471 F.3d at 809)); Mozdzen, 622 F.3d at 685 ("The argument that the
stop-time rule does not apply here is contrary to the plain language of the statute and
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As I have said, in my view cases such as Ortiz-Santiago are not
well reasoned as they would seem to encourage the assertion of
arguments not viable under existing law. At the very least, it is en-
couraging that numerous other courts appear to recognize, following
Butts, that forfeiture should not be found when the law was so well
settled as to foreclose any argument to the contrary.
3. Prejudice
Finally, even assuming that the first two hurdles have been
crossed, for any case in which a merits hearing has already been
held, courts should also insist that the noncitizen demonstrate
prejudice to successfully make a Pereira challenge. To be more pre-
cise, as I explain below, by saying that a showing of prejudice must
be made I mean to refer to a particular type of harm—namely, that
courts should only allow a Pereira challenge as a basis for reopening
proceedings if the noncitizen can show that the outcome of the
removal proceedings might be different if the proceeding is retried.
To be sure, it is not immediately clear from the cases that this
type of prejudice requirement exists when the government fails to
comply with statutory or regulatory requirements applicable to
notices to appear. A primary reason that the law is unclear is that
nearly all of the prior challenges to notices have been unable to
show proof of noncompliance with an express statutory or regulatory
requirement.278 For instance, in Faiz v. Holder, the noncitizen ar-
gued that the notice was defective because it was not written in her
native language.279 The court rejected her complaint, noting that the
statute did not require that notice be given in any particular
language.280 For the same reason, in Parra-Morela v. Holder, the
court found that the alleged defect in the notice—that the officer
who issued it failed to personally sign it—was acceptable because no
precedent, and we reject it." (internal citations omitted)); Yi Di Wang, 759 F.3d at 674-75
(extending Dababneh and deferring to the BIA's decision in Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644,
647 (B.I.A. 2011)).
278. See Parra-Morela v. Holder, No. 11-4064, 2012 WL 5439992, at *1-2 (6th Cir. Nov. 8,
2012) (per curiam); Faiz v. Holder, No. 08-6173-dg, 2010 WL 445506, at *1-2 (2d Cir. Feb. 8,
2010); Lazaro v. Mukasey, 527 F.3d 977, 978, 980 (9th Cir. 2008).
279. 2010 WL 445506, at *1.
280. Id.
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statute or regulation imposes a personal signature requirement.281
And in Lazaro v. Mukasey, the alleged defect was that the notice
failed to fully specify the noncitizen’s violations that subjected them
to removal, as § 1229(a)(1)(D) requires.282 However, the court re-
jected that argument finding that the notice, while poorly done,
satisfied § 1229(a)(1)(D) (“albeit minimally”) by giving some sense
of the reasons why the noncitizen was removable.283
Because the noncitizens in these cases failed to show a lack of
compliance with an express statutory or regulatory requirement, it
is hardly surprising that most of the cases do not discuss any
further requirement to show prejudice. But while the challenges to
the notices in these cases all floundered on the noncitizen’s failure
to show that the government violated some express legal require-
ment, one of the most commonly cited cases in this area does sug-
gest that it is not enough merely to show lack of compliance with a
statutory notice requirement.284
In Kohli v. Gonzales, the noncitizen argued that the removal
order should be set aside because the name and title of the officer
who issued the notice to appear were not legible.285 As in the prior
cases cited above, the court found that there was no legibility
requirement.286 However, the court in Kohli went on to say that the
noncitizen also separately failed to show that she suffered any prej-
udice by the alleged defect.287 The court cited some of its earlier
decisions in which it insisted that a violation of an INS regulation
does not justify invalidating a deportation proceeding unless the
violation “prejudiced the interests of the alien ... that it was
intended to protect.”288 In Kohli, the court reasoned that even if the
notice to appear should have included a legible version of the
issuing officer’s name and title, the notice “fully informed Kohli of
281. 2012 WL 5439992, at *1-2.
282. 527 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2008).
283. Id.
284. See Kohli v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 1061, 1066-68 (9th Cir. 2007).
285. Id. at 1065.
286. Id. at 1068 (“As Kohli has not shown that any statute or regulation requires the
inclusion of the name and title of the issuing officer on the [notice to appear], it follows that
she has not shown that the fact that the name and title on her [notice to appear] are illegible
constitutes a violation of a regulation.”).
287. Id. at 1066-67.
288. Id. at 1067 (citing United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529, 530 (9th Cir.
1980)).
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the charges against her” and told her when and where to appear at
the hearing to contest the government’s bid to remove her.289
Note that Kohli’s concern about prejudice is a specific type of
concern. It is most closely analogous to the rationale invoked by
cases on the civil side that refuse to dismiss or quash service of
process on a defendant under Rule 12(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure absent a showing of prejudice.290 The prejudice that
these cases usually talk about is that the defendant did not receive
actual and adequate notice.291 As one district court put it in denying
a civil defendant’s motion to dismiss for insufficient process,
“Noncompliance with Rule 4 does not mandate dismissal where the
necessary parties have received actual notice of a suit and where
they have not been prejudiced by the technical defect in service.”292
This is entirely consistent with Kohli’s dicta that because she was
“fully informed” of the charges against her and given notice of the
removal hearing, any technical error in the form of the notice could
be excused.293
To be sure, the kind of prejudice that results when defective
notice deprives the defending party of actual, adequate notice is one
kind of significant harm that we should care about. But it is not the
only type of harm that matters. Indeed, it bears noting that non-
citizens do not need to insist on this sort of prejudice showing to
support a Pereira challenge. A lack of actual notice, combined with
a failure to take steps reasonably calculated to ensure that notice is
given, would be an independent basis for relief, one that is firmly
grounded in the due process protections of the Constitution.294 In
289. Id.
290. 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1353 & n.28 (3d
ed. 2018)
291. Id.
292. Simmons v. Stokes, No. 8:11-cv-00175-RMG-JDA, 2011 WL 2198298, at *1 (D.S.C.
May 11, 2011).
293. Kohli, 473 F.3d at 1067.
294. See The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) (“[I]t is not competent for
the Secretary of the Treasury or any executive officer, at any time within the year limited by
the statute, arbitrarily to cause an alien, who has entered the country, and has become
subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its population, although alleged to be
illegally here, to be taken into custody and deported without giving him all opportunity to be
heard upon the questions involving his right to be and remain in the United States. No such
arbitrary power can exist where the principles involved in due process of law are recognized.”);
see also Nazarova v. INS, 171 F.3d 478, 482 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that due process is only
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other words, if a noncitizen can show that he did not receive actual
notice when he should have and that reasonable steps were not
taken to provide him with notice, then invocation of a Pereira chal-
lenge is unnecessary.
By contrast, the kind of prejudice showing that courts should
require before allowing a Pereira challenge in a case that has had a
merits hearing is separate and distinct from the prejudice require-
ment that results when there has not been actual, adequate notice
or any reasonable attempt to provide it. When we are dealing with
a case that has already been tried on the merits, it surely makes
sense to insist that the party who received defective notice must
show that the outcome of the case might be different if we invalidate
the proceedings on the basis of faulty notice and force the complain-
ing party to retry its case again. If the defending party cannot show
the outcome might be different, it is very hard to justify starting
over. Without a prejudice requirement, courts would have to inval-
idate cases based solely on a technical defect in the form of notice,
even when reopening all of these proceedings would not change
their outcomes. Because of the tremendous burdens on the adminis-
tration of the law that would result, the courts should not invalidate
prior decisions solely to correct technical errors if there is no
plausible possibility of a different outcome. In this regard, requiring
the party who receives defective notice to show a potentially
different outcome before invalidating the previous proceedings is
consistent with the Court’s expressed unwillingness to apply new
decisional law retroactively if the administrative burdens of doing
so would be too great.295
This conception of a prejudicial-error requirement for any case in
which a merits hearing has been held is also consistent with the
legal principle embodied in § 706 of the Administrative Procedure
Act that agencies’ errors are only subject to correction if they cause
satisfied if notice is accorded in a manner “reasonably calculated” to ensure that notice
reaches the alien).
295. Cf. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 184-85 (1995) (rejecting the government’s
argument against retroactive application of the judicial decision relating to the appointment
of civilian judges to a military court, noting that “the defective appointments of the civilian
judges affect only between 7 to 10 cases pending on direct review” and that “[a]s for the
Government’s concern that a flood of habeas corpus petitions will ensue, precedent provides
little basis for such fears”).
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harm.296 As the First Circuit once explained, “[a]gency missteps ...
may be disregarded where it is clear that a remand ‘would accom-
plish nothing beyond further expense and delay.’”297 The case that
occasioned that comment is illustrative. In Save Our Heritage, Inc.
v. FAA, the question was whether to set aside an agency decision
authorizing air passenger service from a general aviation airport
over objections from preservationist groups concerned about the
adverse effects of the additional flights on historic and natural
resources near the airport.298 On appeal, the groups argued that the
agency violated several statutory and regulatory requirements in
conducting their environmental assessment of the impact of
authorizing the new flights.299 The First Circuit held that even if the
groups were right that the agency failed to follow all legal require-
ments, they were unable to show that the agency’s factual findings,
on which its ultimate decision was based, might have been
altered.300 Recognizing that some failures to comply with the law are
“too fundamental to disregard,” the court nevertheless concluded:
We will assume that an environmental assessment and finding
of no significant impact might look somewhat different in form
and follow somewhat more complicated procedures than the
study and findings by the FAA in this case. But this case does
not involve a simple refusal to study environmentally problem-
atic consequences. On the contrary, even though only seven to
296. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012) (“[D]ue account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial
error.”); see Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 406 (2009) (finding the rule of prejudicial error
applicable to the Veterans Court, noting identical use of language as the APA’s prejudicial-
error rule in § 706, and noting that “the APA’s reference to ‘prejudicial error’ [in § 706] is
intended to ‘su[m] up in succinct fashion the “harmless error” rule applied by the courts in the
review of lower court decisions as well as of administrative bodies’”) (alteration in original)
(quoting U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURES ACT 110 (1947)); PDK Labs. Inc. v. U.S. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(“If the agency’s mistake did not affect the outcome, if it did not prejudice the petitioner, it
would be senseless to vacate and remand for reconsideration.”). But see Nicholas Bagley,
Remedial Restraint in Administrative Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 253, 259-60 (2017) (noting
that the significance of the prejudicial-error rule for agencies has been “downplayed or
ignored” by the Supreme Court and academic commentators, but noting that it has been more
robustly applied by the lower courts).
297. Save Our Heritage, Inc. v. FAA, 269 F.3d 49, 61-62 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting Kerner v.
Celebrezze, 340 F.2d 736, 740 (2d Cir. 1965)).
298. Id. at 53-54.
299. Id. at 54.
300. Id. at 61-63.
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ten flights a day are realistically at issue, the FAA examined
each of the three principal possible negative effects and found
each to be de minimis, and petitioners have provided no basis for
serious doubt about those findings.301
In short, “[r]emanding for a differently named assessment, where
the project’s negative consequences have already been analyzed and
found to be absent and the findings have been disclosed to inter-
ested parties, is a waste of time,” the court held.302
In excusing the agency error as harmless, the First Circuit relied
on Judge Friendly’s decision in Kerner v. Celebrezze that similarly
rejected a procedural error by the agency. The error in Kerner was
that the statute required the initial administrative fact-finder who
heard evidence to record their impressions of the witnesses for the
benefit of later administrative and judicial decision makers.303 That
did not happen. But while accepting that this procedural error had
occurred and an objection was timely raised, the court refused to re-
verse the agency’s determination because there was no prejudice.304
Once again, the problem was that the complaining party failed to
show that if the agency error had not occurred, the ultimate result
would have been different.305 As Judge Friendly put it, “It would be
fatuous to suppose that if the hearing officer had recommended a
decision in Kerner’s favor, the ultimate result would have been
different or that a remand to obtain a recommendation from him
now would accomplish anything save further expense and delay.”306
The principle behind the prejudicial-error rule of § 706, in turn,
mirrors Rule 61 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which ap-
plies in all civil cases in federal court.307 As noted above, the federal
courts routinely refuse to dismiss or quash service of process on a
defendant for insufficient process if actual notice was received.308
301. Id. at 61-62 (internal citation omitted).
302. Id. at 62.
303. Kerner v. Celebrezze, 340 F.2d 736, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1965).
304. Id. at 740.
305. Id.
306. Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623, 637 (6th
Cir. 1997) (noting that “a mistake that has no bearing on the ultimate decision or causes no
prejudice shall not be the basis for reversing an agency’s determination”).
307. FED. R. CIV. P. 61 (“At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all
errors and defects that do not affect any party’s substantial rights.”).
308. See supra notes 290-92 and accompanying text.
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But a showing of prejudice under Rule 61 also cannot be established
if the service “error is harmless in that it does not change the ruling
in the case by affecting a substantial right of one of the parties.”309
To sum up: courts should insist that the noncitizen demonstrate
prejudice to successfully make a Pereira challenge. By prejudice, I
do not mean the type of prejudice showing that can be made when
the defending party does not receive actual and adequate notice and
attempts at providing notice were not reasonably calculated to do so.
The entitlement to relief in that circumstance already exists. The
prejudice showing that must be made by a noncitizen when a merits
hearing has already been held is, instead, to show that the outcome
of the removal proceedings might be different if the government is
forced to start over by issuing a notice that fully complies with
§ 1229(a). This requirement will ensure that the courts are not over-
whelmed by motions to reopen removal proceedings based solely on
a technical defect in the form of notice if there is no colorable chance
that retrying all of those cases would change their outcomes.
C. The Four Case Types
Thus far, I have shown that whether a Pereira challenge can be
successfully made should involve consideration of three factors:
Pereira’s applicability, either prospectively or retrospectively;310 the
possibility of forfeiture;311 and, finally, the noncitizen’s ability to
demonstrate prejudice resulting from service of a defective notice.312
But not all of these three factors will apply in every instance.
In this final Part of the Article, I discuss the four different case
types in which a Pereira challenge might possibly arise. These are:
(1) proceedings commenced after the Court’s decision was an-
nounced; (2) proceedings commenced before Pereira, but in which no
309. Allied Semi-Conductors Int’l., Ltd. v. Pulsar Components, Int’l, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 618,
623 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 290, § 1353. Appellate courts,
of course, also review trial court decisions in accordance with the policy reflected in Rule 61.
McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984) (“While in a narrow
sense Rule 61 applies only to the district courts ... it is well settled that the appellate courts
should act in accordance with the salutary policy embodied in Rule 61.” (internal citations
omitted)).
310. See supra Part III.B.1.
311. See supra Part III.B.2.
312. See supra Part III.B.3.
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merits hearing has yet taken place; (3) proceedings commenced
before Pereira that are currently on appeal; and, lastly, (4) proceed-
ings commenced before Pereira that are final and for which all
appeals already have been exhausted. As we will see, the three
critical factors that control whether a Pereira challenge can be
made—retroactivity, forfeiture, and prejudice—vary by case type.
1. Proceedings Commenced After Pereira in Which No Merits
Hearing Has Been Held
This is perhaps the easiest case type. Retroactivity is not an is-
sue; application of forfeiture doctrine is straightforward; and there
should be no additional requirement to show prejudice.
a. Retroactivity
Retroactivity is not an issue for this case type. There can be no
dispute that Pereira applies prospectively to all removal proceedings
commenced after the Court’s decision was announced.313 Because
Pereira confirms that proceedings are not properly commenced if
based on a defective notice to appear, as Part II demonstrated, if a
noncitizen timely challenges the notice as defective for lacking the
time and place of the proceedings, then the court must apply Pereira
to require the government to reissue a proper notice or terminate
the proceeding.
b. Forfeiture
The possibility of forfeiture must be considered in any proceeding
commenced after June 2018, but there is nothing particularly dif-
ficult about the inquiry. As noted above, litigants must timely raise
legal points or they are forfeited.314 The only interesting question is
when a Pereira challenge must be raised.
313. See Bradley Scott Shannon, The Retroactive and Prospective Application of Judicial
Decisions, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 811, 816 (2003) (“Rules of law have traditionally been
applied to the parties to the case in which those rules were announced as well as in later
cases, without regard to the date of the disputed events or the nature of the rule.”).
314. See supra text accompanying note 255.
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That answer is also straightforward. A motion challenging the
notice should be timely in most cases if it is filed by the master
calendar hearing.315 A master calendar hearing is the noncitizen’s
first appearance before an immigration judge in removal proceed-
ings.316 It is the hearing, usually quite short, in which the court
considers pleadings, scheduling, and other similar preliminary
matters.317 By contrast, an “individual calendar hearing[ ]” is the
merits hearing where evidence is offered and the immigration judge
decides whether the noncitizen is subject to removal or is otherwise
eligible for any form of relief from removal.318 Although challenges
to the notice should usually be brought by the master calendar
hearing, in some instances, a challenge might still be preserved if
it is raised at least fifteen days before the individual calendar
hearing.319
c. Prejudice 
Finally, for this case type, there should be no additional prejudice
requirement, though admittedly it takes a little bit more work to
understand why.
We said above that the primary reason for imposing an added
prejudice requirement in any case that has had a merits hearing is
that it serves no salutary purpose to force the government to reissue
notice if the result of the new proceedings would almost certainly be
the same.320 However, it is both reasonable and appropriate that
there should be no additional prejudice requirement if there has
not been a prior merits hearing.321 In this circumstance, the burden
on immigration officials to issue notices in compliance with
§ 1229(a) is modest, as the Pereira court itself emphasized.322 It is
315. See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION
COURT PRACTICE MANUAL § 3.1(b)(i)(A) (2016), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1084851/
download [https://perma.cc/D38U-ZKML].
316. Id. § 4.15(a).
317. Id.
318. Id. § 4.16(a).
319. Id. § 3.1(b)(ii)(A).
320. See supra Part III.B.3.
321. See supra Part III.B.3.
322. See Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2119 (2018) (“The dissent’s argument wrongly
assumes that the Government is utterly incapable of specifying an accurate date and time on
a notice to appear and will instead engage in ‘arbitrary’ behavior. The Court does not embrace
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also appropriate to allow a Pereira challenge without any showing
of prejudice for any proceeding commenced after June 2018. Once
the government has been made aware that the time and place infor-
mation must be included in the notice to appear, to require a sepa-
rate showing of prejudice in any new case would effectively excuse
noncompliance with the statute. The law should not encourage
knowing lawlessness by the government.323
Against the modest burden of insisting that the government
comply with § 1229(a), we must weigh the considerable societal
values that are furthered by insisting that the government comply
with the law. As if there were any doubt about the importance of
ensuring compliance with the law, it is worth noting that a few
months after the Pereira opinion came down, the government
started intentionally including incorrect hearing dates—“fake dates”
as they have been termed—in the notices to appear that it issues.324
Reports indicate that Immigration and Customs Enforcement has
been serving noncitizens with notices to appear directing them to
appear at removal hearings on dates that had not been cleared or in
any way coordinated with the immigration court.325 The government
apparently has been so careless as to order them to appear at
midnight, on weekends, and even on dates that do not exist (like one
notice that apparently referred to September 31st as the hearing
those unsupported assumptions. As the Government concedes, ‘a scheduling system
previously enabled DHS and the immigration court to coordinate in setting hearing dates in
some cases.’ Given today’s advanced software capabilities, it is hard to imagine why DHS and
immigration courts could not again work together to schedule hearings before sending notices
to appear.” (citations omitted)).
323. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 477 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“At the
foundation of our civil liberty lies the principle which denies to government officials an
exceptional position before the law and which subjects them to the same rules of conduct that
are commands to the citizen. And in the development of our liberty insistence upon procedural
regularity has been a large factor. Respect for law will not be advanced by resort, in its
enforcement, to means which shock the common man’s sense of decency and fair play.”);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1083 (2010)
(“[I]t is almost always reprehensible for government officials—including judges—to engage
in law-breaking”).
324. Dianne Solis, ICE Is Ordering Immigrants to Appear in Court, but the Judges Aren’t
Expecting Them, DALL. NEWS (Sept. 16, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.dallasnews.com/
news/immigration/2018/09/16/ice-ordering-immigrants-appear-court-judges-expecting
[https://perma.cc/ C4K4-N9NF].
325. Id.
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date).326 This practice is an apparent—if contemptuous and utterly
indefensible—attempt to seemingly comply with the Court’s
decision.327 Yet, as of this writing, the government apparently still
continues to knowingly issue notices to appear with incorrect times
and dates.328
2. Cases Commenced Before Pereira that Have Not Yet Had a
Merits Hearing
For this case type, retroactivity is now at issue, but is straight-
forward. Application of forfeiture doctrine is also easy. Finally, as
with cases commenced after Pereira, there should also be no addi-
tional requirement to show prejudice for this case type.
a. Retroactivity
As discussed above, for all proceedings commenced before June
2018 that are still pending, but in which no individual calendar
merits hearing has yet been held, it is clear that the Court’s decision
in Pereria applies retroactively.329 In addition to the authorities
cited above, it can be added that in immigration proceedings, the
courts commonly recognize that a subsequent judicial decision that
changes the law can provide a basis for reconsideration or reopening
of cases still pending on appeal. The courts consistently recognize,
expressly330 or implicitly,331 that reconsideration or reopening of
326. Id.
327. See id.
328. See Practice Alert: DHS Issuing NTAs with Fake Times and Dates, AM. IMMIGR. LAW.
ASS’N (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.dild.org/infonet/practice-alert-dhs-issuing-ntds-with-fake-
times [https://perma.cc/E7M7-NJ4N].
329. See supra text accompanying note 246.
330. See Dominguez v. Sessions, No. 16-60067, 2017 WL 4231083, at *5 n.4 (5th Cir. Sept.
22, 2017) (per curiam) (recognizing that “fundamental legal change may merit the granting
of a regulatory motion to reopen”); Montoya de Soto v. Sessions, No. 13-70564, 2017 WL
992515, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 15, 2017) (mem.) (noting that the BIA determined that one of its
precedential decisions “applied retroactively” to render the noncitizen ineligible to adjust
status but noting further that “the BIA did not have the benefit of this court’s decision” in a
subsequent case that permitted adjustment of status and remanding to the BIA for
reconsideration); Mata v. Sessions, No. 13-60253, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 3436, at *4-5 (5th
Cir. Feb. 24, 2017) (per curiam) (recognizing that “intervening changes in law have
undermined the BIA’s first basis underlying its denial of Mata’s motion to reopen” but
refusing to reopen case because of inadequate briefing); Nevarez v. Holder, 572 F.3d 605, 609-
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removal proceedings can be based on a subsequent judicial decision
that changes the law. Indeed, it is often said that judges are not just
permitted to apply current law to their review of immigration judge
decisions, they are required to do so.332 The Ninth Circuit has noted
that “when the law is changed before a decision is handed down by
an administrative agency, the agency must apply the new law.”333 As
to still pending cases, the understanding that immigration judges
must apply existing decisional law has been explained not as a
question of applying the law retroactively, but of simply applying
existing law to cases “still the subject of administrative adjudica-
tion.”334 In sum, Pereira should be held to apply to any case that was
still pending as of June 2018.
10 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that the government was relying on a Supreme Court case that “was
decided while this petition for review was pending” and remanding to BIA to determine
whether the Court’s decision “applies retroactively to aliens like petitioners”); Arce-Vences
v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 2007) (“In the light of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Lopez [v. Gonzales, which was announced three years after the noncitizen’s removal order
and held that marijuana possession is not an aggravated felony], we hold that Arce’s offense
of possession of marijuana is not an aggravated felony.”); Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 301
(5th Cir. 2005) (noting that motion for reconsideration can be based on “a change in the law,
a misapplication of the law, or an aspect of the case that the BIA overlooked”).
331. See Avila-Perez v. Lynch, No. 15-60833, 2016 WL 7478505, at *2 (5th Cir. Dec. 28,
2016) (per curiam) (implicitly recognizing that noncitizen could rely on judicial decision that
resulted in “a change in the law” after removal order but refusing to reopen on basis that
noncitizen waited too long to request reopening); Silerio-Nunez v. Holder, No. 08-9556, 2009
WL 4755726, at *1 (10th Cir. Dec. 14, 2009) (implicitly recognizing that motion to reopen
could be based on “the retroactive application of the Supreme Court’s decision” in a case but
refusing to reopen on basis of departure bar); Mendiola v. Mukasey, No. 07-9548, 2008 WL
2222018, at *2 (10th Cir. May 30, 2008) (finding that noncitizen had waived opportunity to
bring motion to reopen removal order based on his second conviction for possession of a
controlled substance, but noting that “[e]ven if we were to consider [the noncitizen’s] motion,
his argument based on the Supreme Court’s decision [issued after his removal order] in Lopez
v. Gonzales, ... which held that a drug possession offense must be a felony under federal law
to qualify as a drug trafficking crime, does not assist him” because he was convicted for
possession after a prior possession conviction).
332. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 486 n.16 (1981).
333. Talanoa v. INS, 397 F.2d 196, 200 (9th Cir. 1968); accord Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y
Gen. of the U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 602-03 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[T]he BIA is required to apply new law
to its review.”); Ortiz v. INS, 179 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he BIA was required to
apply the law existing at the time of its review, even if different from the law applied by the
[immigration judge].”).
334. Ortiz, 179 F.3d at 1156 (quoting U-M-, 20 I & N Dec. 327, 333 (B.I.A. 1991), aff ’d, 989
F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1993)).
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b. Forfeiture
For all proceedings commenced before June 2018 in which no
merits hearing has yet been held, it is similarly appropriate to re-
quire the noncitizen to timely raise a Pereira challenge. The same
principle that applied to post-Pereira cases applies here as well:
arguments available to a litigant that are not timely made are
waived. As was true for proceedings commenced after June 2018, for
cases that were commenced before Pereira, a motion challenging the
notice is certainly timely if it is filed by the master calendar
hearing; in some circumstances, it may be sufficient if raised by the
individual calendar hearing.335
c. Prejudice
Finally, there should be no added prejudice requirement imposed
for any proceedings commenced before June 2018 in which no merits
hearing has yet been held. Just as with cases commenced after
Pereira, requiring the government to reissue a proper notice before
beginning the removal hearing imposes only a modest burden on the
government and ensures that § 1229(a)’s mandates are honored.
3. Cases Commenced Before Pereira that Are Still Pending on
Appeal
This is the most challenging case type. Retroactivity is straight-
forward. Forfeiture raises some hard issues, but the most difficult
issue is application of the prejudice requirement.
a. Retroactivity
As was true with cases commenced before Pereira in which there
had not yet been a removal hearing, Pereira should also apply retro-
actively to any case that is still pending on appeal, either before the
BIA or on petition for review to a federal appellate court.336 One
recent federal appellate court decision squarely supports this view
335. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 315, § 3.1(b)(i)(A).
336. See supra text accompanying notes 329-34.
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as to retroactivity, a case that I discuss in more detail at the end of
the next Section.337
b. Forfeiture
For proceedings commenced before June 2018 that are still pend-
ing on appeal, it would be unfair to conclude that the noncitizen
forfeited making a challenge to the notice since the Court’s subse-
quent decision in Pereira is the basis for the challenge. As noted
above, the better view is that an argument should not be said to
have been forfeited if it was foreclosed under the existing law.338
Before Pereira, the courts were virtually unanimous in holding that
a notice was not defective if it failed to include the time and place of
the removal proceedings.339 Thus, noncitizens were foreclosed from
challenging the sufficiency of the notice and so cannot be said to
have forfeited an argument not available to them.340
As I just noted above, the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in
Plaza-Ramirez v. Sessions squarely supports the view expressed
here.341 Years before the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira, the
noncitizen in Plaza-Ramirez conceded his removability but argued
for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture.342 The immigration judge denied relief
on all counts.343 He appealed to the BIA solely on the basis of with-
holding, but the BIA upheld the immigration judge’s ruling.344
337. See Plaza-Ramirez v. Sessions, 908 F.3d 282, 286 (7th Cir. 2018).
338. See supra text accompanying notes 255-66.
339. See supra Part I.C.
340. The only possible exception would be for noncitizens in the Third Circuit since that
was the only court pre-Pereira to read § 1229(a)’s requirements as mandatory. See Orozco-
Velasquez v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 817 F.3d 78, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2016). That is to say that a
reasonable argument can certainly be made that noncitizens in the Third Circuit forfeited a
challenge to the sufficiency of the notice if they failed to timely make that challenge. Cf. Am.
Fid. Assurance Co. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 810 F.3d 1234, 1241 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that
a jurisdictional defense was available to the defendant when it filed its answer because the
defense could be asserted under existing circuit precedent that was consistent with the
Supreme Court’s subsequent clarification of the defense).
341. 908 F.3d at 286.
342. Id. at 284.
343. Id. at 285.
344. Id. at 286.
2019] PEREIRA’S AFTERSHOCKS 67
While his petition for review was pending with the Seventh
Circuit, Pereira came out.345 He then sought remand to the BIA on
the basis that the Court’s decision makes him eligible for cancella-
tion of removal.346 The Seventh Circuit denied the motion to re-
mand, but that was simply because he had filed the wrong motion.347
Instead, the court said that he should—and still could—seek ad-
ministrative relief by moving to reopen proceedings with the BIA
under § 1229a(c)(7).348 The noncitizen then did so and the Seventh
Circuit indicated that the issue was now properly before the BIA.349
The court did not expressly address either the question of
Pereira’s retroactivity or the question of whether the noncitizen had
forfeited the right to raise an issue he had not raised below.
However, by directing him back to the BIA to consider his new claim
for eligibility for cancellation of removal based on Pereira, Plaza-
Ramirez implicitly and strongly signals that for any proceeding
commenced before June 2018 that remains pending on appeal (i)
Pereira retroactively applies and (ii) a Pereira challenge has not
been forfeited.350 Finally, although Plaza-Ramirez also does not
expressly address the question of the prejudice showing necessary
in such a case, the Seventh Circuit’s decision again is consistent
with the approach outlined here, as explained further in the next
Section.
c. Prejudice 
i. Why Prejudice Is Required
Unlike the first two case types, there is a strong argument for
mandating a prejudice requirement for any case filed before Pereira
that is still on appeal. That is, for this case type it should not be
enough to show merely that the notice was defective. As discussed
above, unless the noncitizen can show that the defect had some im-
pact on her rights—which is to say that the result of the proceedings
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. See id.
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might be different if the government is forced to reissue proper
notice and start again—then there is no point in reopening a case.351
If there is no possibility of a different outcome, then there is no
justifiable basis for treating the removal order as void solely because
the notice to appear did not include the time and place of the pro-
ceedings.352 Requiring noncitizens to show that the error in the
notice was harmful to the noncitizen’s rights in the underlying
proceeding balances the administrative burden of reopening cases
that have already been tried with the enforcement and effectuation
of statutory requirements.
ii. Demonstrating Prejudice
In what circumstances, then, could a noncitizen show prejudice
in the underlying case as a result of a defective notice? One such
possibility is with cancellation of removal, just as it was in Pereira.
If, as in Pereira, the noncitizen can show that she is now eligible for
cancellation of removal because the original notice to appear did not
stop the period of continuous physical presence, then that is relief
to which she might now be entitled.353 The Seventh Circuit’s recent
decision in Plaza-Ramirez is expressly on point here, consistent with
the view I have articulated.354
Another possibility in which a Pereira challenge should be suc-
cessful is as to voluntary departure applications made at the con-
clusion of the removal proceedings. Section 1229c(b)(1) authorizes
immigration judges to grant a noncitizen’s application for voluntary
departure.355 To be eligible for conclusion of voluntary departure
proceedings, the noncitizen has to have been “physically present in
the United States for a period of at least one year immediately
preceding the date the notice to appear was served under section
1229(a).”356 Thus, if a noncitizen had less than a year of physical
presence when they were served with a defective notice to appear
(making them ineligible for voluntary departure), they may now be
351. See supra Part III.B.3.
352. See supra Part III.B.3.
353. See Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2109-10 (2018).
354. See Plaza-Ramirez, 908 F.3d at 286.
355. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1) (2012).
356. Id. § 1229c(b)(1)(A).
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eligible, assuming of course that they satisfy all other statutory
criteria. Thus, this circumstance would also satisfy the prejudice
requirement to warrant remanding or reopening the removal pro-
ceedings.
It should also be possible for a noncitizen to raise a Pereira chal-
lenge if she can also show a change in circumstances has occurred
while her case has been pending on appeal. For instance, a non-
citizen may seek to adjust status based on a marriage.357 But if the
application is sought while the noncitizen is in removal proceedings,
the burden on the noncitizen is higher than it is if the application
were sought before removal proceedings commenced.358 While
showing a defect in the notice to appear is not strictly necessary, it
may aid the noncitizen’s application to adjust status in this circum-
stance. The same reasoning could apply as to changed country
circumstances.
In sum, for any case filed before Pereira that is still on appeal, it
should not be enough to show that the notice was defective. Unless
the noncitizen can also demonstrate that the result of the proceed-
ings might be different if the government is forced to reissue proper
notice and start again, then a Pereira challenge should not be sus-
tained.
4. Cases Commenced Before Pereira that Have Reached Final
Judgment and All Appeals Have Been Exhausted
This leaves one last case category: proceedings commenced before
Pereira that have reached final judgment and in which all appeals
have been exhausted.
a. Retroactivity
As noted, normally there is no judicial retroactivity for fully
closed cases.359 However, there are—arguably—two statutory
exceptions to the general rule against retroactivity for fully resolved
cases that apply in certain immigration removal proceedings. One
357. Id. § 1255(e).
358. See id.
359. See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
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exception is discretionary; the other (and more significant) exception
is mandatory.
i. The Discretionary Exception: Regulatory Motions to
Reopen
There are several sources of statutory authority that allow a mo-
tion to reopen a closed case. A noncitizen who wishes to reopen
removal proceedings has two options. First, she can file a statutory
motion to reopen under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7).360 The noncitizen’s
other option is to ask an immigration court to use its regulatory
power to open proceedings. To be even more precise, there are actu-
ally two kinds of regulatory motions that are recognized—one
applies to immigration judges (under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1));361 the
other applies to the BIA (under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)).362 Both of
these regulatory motions can be triggered either by a motion to
reopen or pursuant to the court’s sua sponte authority.363
Courts have held that in exercising their regulatory authority to
reopen proceedings, immigration judges and the BIA may, but are
not required to, apply new decisions retroactively. For instance, in
Shah v. Holder, the noncitizen was convicted of aggravated criminal
sexual abuse and, on that basis, was subsequently ordered removed
from the country.364 More than six years later, he filed a regulatory
motion to reopen with the BIA on the basis of a Supreme Court
decision handed down after his removal order.365 In Shah, the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the BIA’s order denying the noncitizen’s
regulatory motion to reopen, but it was careful to note that while
the BIA was certainly not obligated to reopen the proceedings to
apply the Supreme Court’s new decision, it had the power to do so
if it wanted to.366 Shah is consistent with other authority recogniz-
ing the broad powers that immigration judges and the BIA possess
to reopen proceedings pursuant to a regulatory motion to reopen.367
360. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7).
361. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (2018).
362. Id. § 1003.2(a).
363. See id. § 1003.2(a); id. § 1003.23(b)(1).
364. 736 F.3d 1125, 1125 (7th Cir. 2013).
365. Id. at 1125-26.
366. Id. at 1127.
367. See, e.g., Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 591, 593-95 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting,
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In sum, notwithstanding the general rule against retroactive
application of new decisions to closed cases, immigration judges and
the BIA may, but are not required to, apply new decisions retroac-
tively to closed cases.
ii. The Mandatory Exception: In Absentia Orders
More importantly, there also appears to be a mandatory statuto-
ry exception to the general rule against retroactivity for closed
cases that applies to removal orders entered in absentia. An in
absentia order is entered whenever it is established that the
noncitizen received notice of the removal proceeding but did not
attend.368 The view that courts must apply at least some new
judicial decisions retroactively finds its strongest support in the
specific language in § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).369 According to its sister
provision, § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i), a noncitizen has 180 days after the
removal order entered in absentia to file a statutory motion to
reopen when the basis for reopening is that the noncitizen’s failure
to appear was “because of exceptional circumstances,” defined else-
where in the statute.370
By contrast, § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) authorizes the noncitizen to file
a statutory motion to reopen a removal order entered in absentia “at
any time.”371 A motion under this subsection must be based on a
showing that the noncitizen did not receive notice “in accordance
with paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a).”372 Note the striking
contrast between § 1229a(b)(5)(C) subsections (i) and (ii) in the time
limit that Congress has prescribed for filing a statutory motion to
reopen an in absentia order. The former is expressly limited to 180
days, but in the latter Congress has authorized a motion to reopen
inter alia, the broad discretion the Board retains in deciding regulatory motions to reopen).
368. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A) (2012).
369. Id. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).
370. Id. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i); see also id. § 1229a(e)(1) (defining exceptional circumstances
as referring to “battery or extreme cruelty to the alien or any child or parent of the alien,
serious illness of the alien, or serious illness or death of the spouse, child, or parent of the
alien” that is “beyond the control” of the noncitizen).
371. Id. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).
372. Id. To be precise, a motion under this subsection can be based either on a showing that
the noncitizen did not receive notice “in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of section
1229(a),” or that the noncitizen was “in Federal or State custody” and the failure to appear
was not the noncitizen’s fault. Id.
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based on improper notice to be filed “at any time.”373 Given this
expressly unlimited scope, a strong argument can be made that
§ 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) permits retroactive application of any new judi-
cial decision that relates to whether the noncitizen received proper
notice.
In sum, while normally there is no judicial retroactivity for fully
closed cases, there are arguably two statutory exceptions to the
general rule against retroactivity that could justify applying Pereira
even in cases that have been fully resolved and in which all appeals
have been exhausted. Since the first of the exceptions is entirely
discretionary with the immigration courts, the more significant
exception is the mandatory exception in § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) for any
removal order entered in absentia.
b. Forfeiture
With the possible exception of proceedings where the appeal goes
to the Third Circuit,374 there should be no forfeiture for all other
cases that closed before June 2018. The no-forfeiture rationale is the
same as it is for noncitizens whose cases are still pending on appeal:
they should not be said to have forfeited an argument that was not
available to them at the time.375
c. Prejudice
The remaining factor—whether a prejudice requirement should
be imposed—is arguably the hardest issue to resolve for this last
case type. On the one hand, the same rationale that informed our
thinking as to cases still on appeal would seem equally applicable
to cases that have been fully and finally resolved. That is, if there
would be no change in the outcome of the underlying case, then
there is no justifiable basis for treating the removal order as void
solely because the notice to appeal did not include the time and
place of the proceedings. On this view, unless the noncitizen can al-
so demonstrate that the result of the proceedings might be different
373. Compare id., with id. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i).
374. See supra note 340 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 339-40 and accompanying text.
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if the government is forced to reissue proper notice and start again,
then a Pereira challenge should not be sustained. Finally, allowing
a Pereira challenge to be made without an accompanying showing
of prejudice for this case type would perversely reward those who
did not even bother to show up for their removal proceedings over
those who did. That seems like an anomalous result that should be
avoided.
However, against these sound, prudential considerations are
the literal words of § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), which expressly permits a
motion to rescind a removal order entered in absentia if the alien
“did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of
section 1229(a).”376 This language is indistinguishable from the
language that the Court construed in Pereira.377 Recall that the stop-
time rule (§ 1229b(d)(1)) provides that the period of continuous
physical presence ends “when the alien is served a notice to appear
under section 1229(a).”378 And remember that the Pereira majority
refused to accept the government’s and the dissent’s argument that
the word “under” in § 1229b(d)(1) was ambiguous because it could
just as readily mean “authorized by” or “subject to”379: “[W]e think
it obvious that the word ‘under,’ as used in the stop-time rule, can
only mean ‘in accordance with’ or ‘according to,’ for it connects the
stop-time trigger in § 1229b(d)(1) to a ‘notice to appear’ that con-
tains the enumerated time-and-place information described in
§ 1229(a)(1)(G)(i).”380
Given the Court’s construction of the phrase in the stop-time rule,
“when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a),”
along with its treatment of “under” as equivalent to “in accordance
with,”381 a strong argument can be made that the phrase in
§ 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) “did not receive notice in accordance with
paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a),”382 must be similarly con-
strued. Thus, the plain language of § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), along with
Pereira’s construction of identical language in the stop-time rule,
376. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).
377. See Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2111 (2018).
378. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1).
379. Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2117.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).
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makes clear that courts must permit a motion to rescind an in
absentia order even if it is solely based on a Pereira defect, without
any accompanying prejudice showing.
Any fear that the floodgates would open if Pereira challenges are
permitted for this case type without an accompanying prejudice
requirement should be minimal, given practical realities. Few non-
citizens who have been ordered removed in absentia are likely to
know they may have the right to rescind their removal orders; fewer
still will have the wherewithal to hire a lawyer to help them
through the process. And, even for those few who are sufficiently
informed and determined to challenge their prior removal order,
there would be little practical reason for them to seek to do so if on
rehearing the result would be the same. Thus, we can reasonably
anticipate that only a very small fraction of noncitizens who were
ordered removed in absentia will have sufficient incentive to seek
to rescind the order.383
Of course, if it turns out that this estimate is wrong, and the
courts do see a deluge of motions to rescind in absentia orders,
Congress is always free to amend § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). That is as it
should be. After all, it is the literal language of the statutory section
that provides the strongest basis on which a Pereira challenge can
be made as to an in absentia order entered after a defective notice.
And no one should have much sympathy for the government, which
has chosen for years to ignore the plain mandate of § 1229(a).
383. There is one important circumstance in which a Pereira challenge should not succeed
even as to an in absentia order. Noncitizens who reenter the country after a removal order are
subject to criminal prosecution under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. See id. § 1326(a). Criminal reentry
under § 1326 is a federal felony punishable by up to twenty years in prison. Id. § 1326(b). If
the removal order was entered in absentia and the noncitizen attempts to get that order
rescinded on the basis of Pereira (and thereby try to invalidate the predicate removal order
on which the felony criminal reentry charge is based), the courts should reject such an
argument. In § 1326(d), Congress has specifically limited the grounds on which a noncitizen
may collaterally attack the underlying deportation order. See id. § 1326(d). Without
belaboring the point, suffice it to say that none of the grounds listed in § 1326(d) could be
satisfied if the only error was the government’s failure to include the time and place of the
proceedings in the notice to appear. See id.
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CONCLUSION
The Court’s decision in Pereira has generated an intense debate
about whether the case applies not just when cancellation of re-
moval is sought, but to all immigration removal proceedings. I have
shown that it is wrong to assert that Pereira bears no relevance
beyond the specific and narrow context addressed by the case.
Pereira’s construction of the notice requirements in § 1229(a) is
necessarily applicable to all notices to appear.
At the same time, immigration advocates are also wrong that a
Pereira defect constitutes a non-waivable defect in the immigration
court’s subject matter jurisdiction. A faulty notice bears no rele-
vance either to the immigration court’s subject matter jurisdiction
or, for that matter, to its personal jurisdiction over noncitizens.
But while defective notice is irrelevant to an immigration court’s
jurisdiction, a Pereira challenge can still be made in certain cases.
Whether there are consequences to a defective notice turns on three
factors: (1) Pereira’s applicability, either prospectively or retro-
spectively; (2) the possibility of forfeiture; and (3) the noncitizen’s
ability to demonstrate prejudice. For cases commenced after Pereira,
as well as for cases commenced before the Court’s decision that have
not yet had a merits hearing, the holding in Pereira should control.
And in these two case types, as long as the noncitizen timely raises
an objection to the notice, the courts should require the government
to reissue proper notice, on penalty of dismissal if it does not. No
additional prejudice showing should be required for these two case
types. This result imposes only a modest burden on the government
to require immigration officials to issue proper notices. Balanced
against that modest burden, there is a compelling interest in en-
suring governmental compliance with the law.
For proceedings commenced before Pereira that are still on ap-
peal, the Court’s decision should also be found to apply retroactively
to them as well. Forfeiture should not be an issue for most of these
cases since the argument was unavailable to most noncitizens before
June 2018. However, for any case filed before Pereira that is still on
appeal, it should not be enough to show that the notice was
defective. Unless the noncitizen can also demonstrate that the
result of the proceedings might be different if the government is
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forced to reissue proper notice and start again, then a Pereira
challenge should not be sustained.
Finally, Pereira does not apply retroactively to most proceedings
in which all appeals already have been exhausted, but there are
some exceptions to this general rule. The primary exception is for
cases in which an order of removal was issued in absentia. For
these cases, the literal language of § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), paired with
Pereira’s construction of the indistinguishable language in the stop-
time rule, means that courts should permit a motion to rescind an
in absentia order even if it is solely based on a Pereira defect,
without any accompanying showing of prejudice.
Now, more than a year after Pereira, immigration advocates
should be able to see more clearly that the lower courts have
rejected (properly in my view) their untenable arguments for
reading Pereira to void on jurisdictional grounds any and all cases
commenced without a proper notice to appear. The alternative
approach that I have laid out in this Article more carefully and
faithfully applies the Court’s decision in reasoned and defensible
ways. To be sure, this approach limits Pereira’s reach to a much
smaller universe of past and future cases. But, after having had
their unrestrained jurisdictional arguments rejected again and
again, immigration advocates may come to see that a more mea-
sured and supportable reading of Pereira has a much greater chance
of success.
